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ABSTRACT
Within the framework of Pascual-Leone's Theory of Constructive Operators
(TCO), 252 Zulu-speaking children in the 7-8 , 9-10 and 11 -:-12 age-groups
were tested four times on the FIT RAC 794, a measure of mental capacity
or !i-power.
Two hypotheses were investigated: (i) AIIlocal" hypothesis (related to the
fact that many black South African schoolchi Idren appear to struggle at
school) was that 'all children have the same ~-power. Performance
differences are explained in terms of different learning experiences,
which give rise to different repertoires of executive structures
responsible Jor allocating M-power. It was predicted that on Trial 1 of
the FIT children would underperform, but that with repeated exposure to
the task they would develop the executives necessary for success. (ii) A
"general" hypothesis sought to test the TCO's theoretical prediction that
there is an age-linked developmental ceiling on performance, and that in
spite of over-learning children will not perform beyond their age-
determined ~-power.
As predicted the children underperformed on Trial 1. They reached
cri terion on Tri a1 2 and then overperformed on Tri a1 3 where performance
reached a ceiling with no further significant improvement on Trial 4.
The fact that chi Idren achieved scores above those predicted by the TCO
on Trials 3 and 4 was explained in terms of non-M facilitating factors,
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Predicted maximum ~-power values as a function of age,
and their correspondence to the Piagetian substage
sequence.
Age distribution of subjects.
Age-group distribution of subjects
Goodman's data on the percentage of correct FIT
responses as a function of age and stimulus class.
Means and standard deviations for the three age groups
on each trial for the seven item classes.








5.4.1 Results of Tukey's tests investigating differences in 83
mean performance on trials 1 to 4 for each age group.
5.4.2 Results of Tukey's tests investigating age-group 84
differences in performance for each trial.
5.4.3.1 Results of Tukey's tests investigating differences in 85
age-group performance meaned across the four trials.
5.4.3.2 Results of Tukey's tests investigating differences in 85






Bhaskar's transformational model of the society/person
connection




4.2 FIT RAC 794 : Class 4 + 1 Item . 69
5.1 7 to 8 year aIds : Percentage of correct responses per 87
item class for Trials 1 to 4.
5.2 9 to 10 year aIds Percentage of correct responses 89
per item class for Trials 1 to 4.
5.3 11 to 12 year aIds Percentage of correct responses 90
5.4
per item class for Trials 1 to 4.
Trial 1 : Percentage of responses correct per stimulus





Trial 2 : Percentage of responses correct per stimulus 93
class for 7 - 8's, 9- 10's and 11 - 12's.
Trial 3 : Percentage of responses correct per stimulus 94
class for 7 - 8's. 9 - 10 ls and 11 - 12's.
Trial 4 : Percentage of responses correct per stimulus 95
class for 7 - 8's. 9 - 10 I sand 11 - 12's.
INTRODUCTION
Many black South African children appear to struggle at school, especially
during the first few years. This is manifest in a high rate of failure in
grade one.
Various sorts of explanation have been offered for poor schoo l
performance. One sort of explanation holds that there are culturally
determined variations in basic cognitive structures, and hence in
performance. This view - cultural relativism - is based on the assumption
that cognitive development can be explained as a function of learning ~
alone - with no recourse to the notion of a universal aspect of human
development common to all people regardless of variations in culture.
Different cultures are said to provide different learning experiences,
with consequent different cognitive structures and performance
differences. Such an assumption informs the view of Cole and his co-
workers at the Laboratory of Human Cognition (LCHC), for example, who
claim there are 11 cultural differences in the events out of which
people can create schemata l' , and for this reason 11••• intelligence will be
different across cultures insofar as there are differences in the kinds of K
problems that different cultural milieus pose their initiates. 1I (1982, p.
710).
The LCHC operate within the basic experimental paradigm that gUides
research in cross-cultural psychology. The essence of this approach is
expressed in formula M= f(C), where Mstands for mind (or cognition or
intelligence) and C for a particular culture. In these terms mind is
regarded as the dependent variable, and culture as the . independent
variable. Thus culture is relevant to cognitive development because
{
cognition or mind is a function of culture.'
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The present research uses the theoretical framework provided by Piaget,
Vygotsky and Pascual-Leone to show the limitations of this view on the
grounds that it is based on an inadequate notion of the respective roles
of learning or culture and cognitive development in intellectual
performance.
This inadequacy may be traced to the experimental method's approach to the
relation between mind and culture:
1) they are treated as two separate entities rather than as two
interacting phenomena locked into an ongoing process of mutual
transformation
2) they are treated as static systems, failing to appreciate their
essentially socio-historic nature.
As a result of these notions the experimental method is unable to account
for change either in the individual IS life-span or in the life-span of a
society. Miller (1984) points to the dangers of such a theory,
particularly in South Africa. A theory that emphasises racial differences
at the expense of a focus on universal human characteristics fits well ?
with the prevailing repressive political ideology of apartheid which seeks
to maintain IIwhitell and IIwesternll2 supremacy in the face of a IIblack" and
"afrf cen" majority (Craig and Miller, 1984).
IIIn its benign form cultural relativity is an
injunction not to allow prejudice to influence
comparisons between cultures. But in a malignant form
it becomes separate development in which the so-called
cultural relativity of various groups provides a basis
for a social system that at best encourages, and, at
worst forces people to remain locked into their own
cultural past ." (Miller, 1984, p. 5).
Wexler (1982) warns that the experimental approach,
11 "I s a system of collective representations that
make us content with the present, portraying it as
3
natura l and inevitable. It systematically excludes
consideration of structured incipient changes, and
thus performs the role of affirmation and legitimation
of the status quo." (p, 2).
This study looks to the developmental method (outlined by Vygotsky, and
practiced by Piaget and Pascual-Leone) as a more fruitful and appropriate
approach to the intellectual performance of children in a rapidly changing
society. Rather than viewing children as immobile prisoners of static
cultural constraints, this method focusses on child's ability to overcome
the constraints of.his/her cultural context. It does so by focussing. on
the generative mechanisms3 that produce change in the interaction between
learning and development which propels the developing child to adulthood.
As opposed to the LCHC and other theorists within the experimental
paradigm, who claim that development occurs BY learning, exponents of the
)
developmental method argue that development occurs THROUGH learning.
Pascual-Leone's theory of cognitive development acknowledges the
importance of context-specific achievements which are the backbone of
the LCHC's theory. However, he poses another equally important level in
the cognitive organisation of the developing child: that of context-free
operators, in dynamic interaction with context-specific operations.
His most important context-free operator is~: a quantitative factor
which determines the number of operations or schemes a child can
simultaneously consider in solving a particular task. Progress from one
Piagetian development stage to another is possible because with
development the child acquires the ability to conjointly apply more and
more schemes in task-solving. Allocation of M-power is determined by I- "-
context-specific executive schemes,
learning/experience.
which are a direct function of h t
It 'k&
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This study investigates the implication of Pascual-Leone's theory that all
children - regardless of culture or learning experience - are endowed with
the same amount of ~-power which develops at a constant rate from age to ?
age, that is that all children have the same basic mental capacity. In a
study conducted by Globerson (1981) gifted, normal and disadvantaged
children were found to have the same ~-power despite very different
performance.
The present study has two objectives. One is more local, referring
specifically to black South African schoolchildren. The other objective
,
seeks to test an aspect of Pascual-Leone's theory at a more general level.
The IIl ocal" objective concerns itself with Pascual-Leone's contention that
performance differences are the result of different learning experiences
which result in different repertoires of executive structures. As opposed
to the cultural relativists who seek to generalise from performance
Pascual-Leone has devised a number of tests for ~-power. In most of these
tests learning is controlled. Before the test is administered, children
are trai~ to perform the elements that make up the test. One test is
the CSVI where children are trained to make nine associations and only
those whQ are perfectly trained are used
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This study will use the Figural Intersection Test (FIT), a pencil-and-
paper test with embedded geometrical figures.
-_.-----
It is usually assumed that
schoolchildren are alrea~~!amiliar with the elements making up the FIT.
However in this study this assumption may not be warranted because of the
kinds of experience black South African schoolchildren have had before
'!\r--.\""", \ \."\.1 (\~ r fschool. Most come from poor backgrounds and so do not have the variety 0
toys such as puzzles, drawing books, etc, that are part of western-
industrialised-technological pre-school experience.
A pilot study suggests these children perform erratically on the FIT. The
present study investigates this phenomenon. Unlike the CSVI, learning is
not controlled and the present study attempts to understand the learning
process as it relates to ~-capacity. Instead of teaching children the
necessary executives for performing the test in advance as in the CSVI,
thereby eliminating the effects of learning on performance, the children
are required to repeat the FIT several times. By repeated exposure to the
task it is hypothesised the children will develop ' the necessary
executives.
It is expected that not all the children will perform to criterion the
first time they do the test. However, once they are provided with the
necessary experience they will perform to criterion. Such an ' outcome
would serve to demonstrate empirically that poor performance is a function
of inappropriate learning and experience to develop the kinds of ~
executives necessary for adequate task performance.
The more general objective of the study is to test Pascual-Leone1s
hypotheses that there is a developmental restriction on performance at ~
"'_C._' ~'_.__ ' . '~"""
each stag~, and that in spite of over-learning children will not be able
to perform beyond their ~-power. This hypothesis will be examined by
6
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continuing the testing procedure after the criterion i s reached.
It must be stressed that because ~-power is independent of learning or \
experience, repeated testing does not invalidate a test designed to
measure ~-power. On the contrary , improvement in performance as a result
of practice must be attributed to learning factors.
A possible outcome of the research is that children will perform the FIT
test correctly on first application. However the pilot study suggests
this is unlikely, and it is expected that performance will improve with
learning. This would enable us to conclude that once children have the
necessary experience they perform to criterion.
The finding that performance improved with learning would also point
towards the conclusion that all performance tests, including IQ, are ~
affected by experience. Thus the practice in South Africa of rating tests
differently for different populations would be shown to be unfortunate
insofar as it wrongly suggests some kind of inherent difference in
intellectual ability. Furthermore, it would indicate that the . effort
expended on this kind of work would be better used in trying to understand
which kinds of learning experience best promote school achievement.
The finding that children have the same mental capabilities and that the
situation-bound executives controlling these capacities are a function of ~
learning and experience would point towards social, political and economic
explanations for under-performance at school. All these conclusions would
point towards the need for a learning environment that facilitates the




1. This project uses the terms II mindll and II cult ure ll as defined by Craig
(1985, p. 25). Mind, which will be used interchangeably with
cognition, refers to lithe totality of the organism's psychological
power or ability to adapt to a mi l i eu", Culture refers to lithe
totality of a group's power to institute tried and tested guidelines
for adaptation. 'Culture' may therefore be seen as the term for the
'recipes' for living embodied in the institutions of societyll. Thus
"learning" and "experience" fall within the definition of "culture.
2. The word "western 11 is used to refer to what Mi 11 er (1984) ca11 s
"western-industrialised-urban-technological-schooled society" (p. '\
21) .
3. Generative mechanisms are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.
They refer to the "deep structures" of a phenomenon that give rise to
its manifest behaviour. "In terms of change and development,
'generative mechanisms' refer to the ability to adapt. 'Change' and
'development' are used interchangeably to indicate the process of
unfolding greater degrees of complexity or maturityll (Craig, 1985, p.
25) .
REVIEW OF THEORETICAL ISSUES
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This section critically examines the presuppositions of cultural
relativism in order to argue that it does not come to grips with the
crucial relevance of development in the mind-culture issue. This will be
traced to its roots in the experimental approach, with its attendant
assumptions about the relation between mind and culture.
A prominent contemporary expression of cultural relativism is the work of
the Laboratory -of Comparative Human Cognition or LCHC (1982), and one of
its chief researchers, Michael Cole (Cole, 1975, Cole and Scribner, 1974,
Cole et aL 1971, Griffin and Cole, 1984). They assume that all children,
regardless of culture, begin their lives with uniform cognitive ability.
Thereafter their cognitive development is determined predominantly by the
learning experiences provided by their particular culture.
IICulturat' differences are merely the expressions of
the many products that a univer~~humgn mind can
' manufact ure , given the wide variations in conditions
of life, and culturally valued act ivl t ies " (Cole and
Scribner, 1974, p, 172).
-This domain-specific theory of learning is similar to the old-fashioned
behaviourist S~R approach 't o cognition, although the LCHC re-phrase it in
E-T terms. According to them, the task of the cross-cultural psychologist
is to explain differences i~ the manifest performance of children in
various tasks (T) by linking the tasks to the experiences that gave rise
to them (E) with no recourse to any universal, maturational factor in
·development . This approach qualifies Cole and the LCHC as psychologists
in the experimental mould as outlined by Vygotsky (1978).
The LCHC argue that the extent to which learning in one context controls
performance in another depends on three factors alone:
1) what the individual learns on the basis of experience in the first
11
context;
2) the similarity between the two performance tasks; and
3) the activity of other people in the second context (LCHC, 1982, p.
674).
Generalised response tendencies derive not from "central processor"
cognitive structures such as those postulated by Piaget, but from common
features shared by the current task and the previous contexts.
"We are adopting a position championed 75 years ago by
Thorndike when he insisted that the extent to which
learning in one situation transfers to learning and
performance in others depends on the similarity
between setti ngs. 11 (Ibid, p. 674).
Thus context-specific intellectual achievements become the basis for
cognitive development. Development is seen as the acquisition of
increasingly generalised rules that apply to a progressively larger set
of specific domains of experience.
"Development in this view is virtually never gen-
era I .... The concept of stage is seconda ry ." (LCHC,
1982, p. 698).
Depending upon how long it takes for the world to provide the child with
appropriately informative experiences, the child will respond to problems
in a given domain in a characteristic way. Insofar as it takes time to
undergo the needed experiences, children growing up in similar
circumstances are likely to reach the same stages at about the same ages.
"Development is the acquisition of ever-wider ranges
of contexts to which a constant set of cognitive
capacities an~ more powerful (general) rules for
interpreting the phenomena of the environment are
applied." (LCHC, 1982, p. 700).
Culture organises for the progressive "stages" of development to occur by:
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1) arranging for the raw occurrence or non-occurrence of specific basic
problem-solving environments; 2) organising the frequency of the same
kinds of events in these learning environments; 3) shaping the patterning
or co-occurrence of events; and 4) regulating the level of difficulty of
the task at hand. Cultural relativism is the logical conclusion of this
approach. Since cognitive development is a function of learning,
cognition is seen to differ across cultures because different cultural ~
conditions pose different kinds of problems.
The foundation stone of such a cross-cultural theory of intelligence is
the necessity of exploring cultural differences in the events out of which
people create cognitive "schemata".
"Intelligence will be different across cultures
insofar as there are differences in the kinds of
problems that different cultural milieus pose their
initiates No universal notion of a single
general ability, called intelligence, can be
abstracted from the behavior of people whose
experiences in the world have systematically been ~
different from birth in response to different life
predicaments handed down to them in their ecocultural
niche." (LCHC, 1982, p. 710).
This heavy emphasis on the situational determinants of behaviour commits
the cultural relativists to the search for a "theory of situations".
Research should aim at establishing culturally determined experimental
factors that give rise to various behaviours.
11Our situation-dependent theory will have to specify
the rules underlying the patterns of behaviour that
are seen in different situations." (Cole and Scribner,
1974, p. 194).
Situation, the independent variable, is manipulated in order to measure
its effect on behaviour/performance.
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This view of development as the accumulation of learning experiences is
based on three fundamental implications about the relationship of mind and
culture which are embedded in the M= f(C) view of the world.
i) The relation between mind and culture is static and can be examined
ahistorically in terms of manifest performances at a given time.
ii) Mind and culture can be conceived of as separate and independent
)
phenomena.
iii) There is a unidirectional,
..., "-
"J \I,j"{'1J,;, \)Jt; J C~ iD vi ';rh, :1";~.5' '~ ) S
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causal relationship between mind and
culture, mind being a product of culture.
These assumptions are examined with a view to providing an alternative
account of this relation, which emphasises that in order to fully
understand any phenomenon, be it mind, culture or the relationship between
them, one must examine it in the process of change. Cultural relativists
such as Cole and t he LCHC not only ignore this insight, but their method
actually excludes t he possibility of accommodating it.
Vygotsky stresses that any change in the theoretical assumptions informing
a theory necessarily goes hand in hand with a change in method, since
method is a reflection of the way a researcher approaches and seeks to
solve a problem. In this way - "... the method is simultaneously
prerequisite and product, the tool and the result of the study." (1978, p.
p, 65). His term "theory-method" embodies his view of the ultimate ~
inseparability of the two domains.
Implicit in the M= f(C) equation is the assumption that mind and culture
can be regarded as separate systems.
",......_._,~., ..-
the methopology of the LCHC and Cole,
This assumption is reflected in cI&M(
et;
which examines the mind-culture ~AJ
relation by varying culture (the independent variable) and looking at the
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effect this has on cognition (the dependent variable). This equation is
upheld by the related assumptions that the two phenomena are causally
related in a unidirectional way (E - T or culture - mind) and that they
can be operationalised as states rather than processes since human
behaviour is essentially reactive.
According to Vygotsky, to view psychological processes as states
misconceives their essential nature. Human behaviour is not reactive as
it has a "transforming effect on nature, and the interaction of the -two
phenomena should be seen as "... a process undergoing changes right before
one I S eyes. 11 (Vygotsky, ·1978) . He rejects the experimental paradigm on
the grounds of its failure t o comprehend that to discover the nature or
essence of the development of a phenomenon is to "... encompass (it)
in all its phases and changes
shows what i t is I • 11 (Ibid, p. 65).
for lit is only in movement that a body
Miller (1984) too claims that human activity is not reactive, but should
be seen as "both responsive to and generative of the world in which it
occurs ll. (p. 6). This view forms the foundation-stone for a new
conception of the mind-culture relationship which locates the two
phenomena within a unitary · system. According to this view it is
meaningless to separate them as causally interrelated independent variable
and dependent variable forming two separate systems that can be
lIexperimentallyll manipulated.
This means that neither culture nor mind can be treated as static entities
or as II pure" concepts, functioning or existing independently of each
other, neither can one be defined without referring to the other. The
· /,""' ,(.,.•A 'I(,! t~/) dialectic ' view.(Georgoudi, 1983) which places mind and culture within a
(\.;",1: : \A;\,t,'.j,) ,;





unitary system accommodates this insight.
"From the dialectic perspective the study of
independent entities and their interaction is replaced
by a concern with concrete re2at ions in a continuous
process of creation, change and transformation."
(Ibid, p. 84) .
However, Bhaskar (1979) warns against the conception of individuals and
society as a dia2JJ.kPica2 unity, which views them as "fixed in an ongoing
process of created and recreated relations." (~eorgoudi, 1983, p. 84). He
argues that it is wrong to view the two phenomena as two moments of t he
. -----
same process, when in fact there is an "ontolog ical hiatus" between them.
-.~._~-
Rather than say that persons create society and vice versa , he prefers to
see them reproducing and transforming each other. The dialectical model
" seems to involve continuous recreation, with genuine novelty,
seemingly entailing incomplete social formation, something of a mystery."
(Bhaskar, 1979, p. 47). He replaces the dialectic model with his own
'transformational I model, in which society provides the necessary
-----
conditions for human action, and human action is the necessary condition
for society, yet both are recognised as radically different in ontological
~-_ . " '- '- " ~"'.'- "- - " ',
status.
"The model of the society/person connection I am
proposing could be summarised as follows: People do
, not create society. For it always pre-exists them and ..;
is a necessary condition for their activity. Rather,
society must be regarded as an ensemble of structures,
practi ces and conventions which indi vidual s· reproduce
or transform, but which would not exist unless toeY
did so. Society does not exist independently of human '
activity (the error oDreification). But it is not
the product of it (the error of voluntarism). Now the
process whereby the stocks of skills, competencies and
habits appropriate to given social contexts, and
necessary for the reproduction and/or transformation
of society, are acquired and maintained could be
generically referred to as 'socia2isation '. It is
important to stress that the reproduction and/or
transf~rmation of society, though for the most part
unconsciously achieved, is nevertheless still an
achievement, a skilled accomplishment of active
16
subjects. not a mechanical consequent of antecedent
condrt.ions ," (Ibid. pp. 45 - 46).
Bhaskar's model of the society-person connection is presented in Figure
1. 1 :
11 > Society -..
I I I I
I I I 1
I1 I I
Socialisation 11 I I
I I I I
I I I I
I I
I I





Figure 1 Bhaskar's transformational model of the society/person
connection (Ibid. p. 45).
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Bhaskar claims that by attributing to society an independent ontological
status. his model emphasises IImaterial continuityll compared to the
.
dialectical model wh ich regards society as eternally incomplete in the
sense that it is constantly being recreated. The transformational model
as a result of its emphasis on material continuity, can sustain a
genuine concept of change, and hence of hi.et oru ," (Ibi d, · p. 47).
Miller (1984) adapts Bhaskar's model 11 to serve qS a foundation for a
human science specifically directed to an understanding of change. 11 (p.
12). He does so by expanding the arrows of "soc i al i sat ion" and
IIreproduction/transformationll into a 11••• third dimension generated
by, or abstracted from, the primary datum of the social and individual
domains ll• which serves to explicate further the relationship between the
two domains or dimensions (Ibid, p. 12). From the social domain he
abstracts a set of ro2es prescribed by the existing social forms. (These
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abstracted roles are called lIact ors"). From the individual domain he
abstracts the concept of a group from the plurality of individuals.
lilt is at this (third) level that Bhaskar's insistance
that people and society should not be regarded as
forming a dialectical unity becomes significant.
Theories about social ' forms and individual agents
cannot be related directly.... It is only in the
context of action that the four analytical categories
of social, actor, individual and group acquire a
functional . quality that animates the model The
dialectic resides in the process whereby an individual
engages in a role prescribed by a social form, or
alternat~velYj . a social form is expressed in a group
of individuals. The two unitary processes may be
understood as mind and culture. What this . model
asserts is that the terms 'mind' and'culture ' should
be understood as mind-in-action and culture-in-
act ton." (Ibid, p. 'j4).
It is this action link between the ontologically distinct social and
individual domains which qualifies Miller's expansion of Bhaskar's model
as a conceptualisation of the mind-culture relationship .~hat takes account
of change.
Not -only does ~he experimental approach's view of mind and culture as
independent entities preclude the investigation of change. Its
ahistorical perspective does this too. Luria stresses that it is
important to situate the mind-culture relationship historically.
lilt seems surprising that the science of psychology
has avoided the idea that mental processes are social
and h.ietiox-ical: in origin." (Luria, 1976, p. 3).
The cultural relativist viewpoint which looks at differences between
cultures, at anyone given t ime is unable to accommodate the ever-
changing nature of mind and society. The problematic nature of this
position is evident in the LCHC I S contention that all cultures are "
equally effective in producing ways of dealing with the problems of
survival under unique patterns of constraint." (LCHC, 1982, p. 710).
(1)
\) ,\ , .
..: ·.· ' 1
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Miller (1984) points to the flaw in this claim.
"lf ways of 'dealing with the problems of survival'
are 'equally effective' then the question as to why
culture or mind would bother to change remains an
enigma." (P. 3).
Not only do the LCHC and Cole fail to accommodate the possibility of
change within a society, they also lack insight into the essence of
change/development in an individual's life-span. In a later section it
"I •
-t- 'J~l' {J. ~\""; ~.
i
will be argued . that the essence of development is the child's
confrontation with contradictions - between .t he familiar and the
unfamiliar, and the old and the new. Their method of making comparisons
between children of different cultures on familiar tasks can at most tell
us about the specific performance of particular children, and nothing
about the longitudinal development of generalised competencies in the
life-span of the individual child.
This stress on the importance of change points to the inadequacy of Cole's
focus on manifest performance. In the establishment of his theory of the
mind-culture relation, Vygotsky argues that cognitive processes are often
the product of a long history of social transformations which may have
become "fossilised" or mechanised over time. "Their outer appearance
tells us nothing about their internal nature ." (1978, p. 64). Based on
the as~ption that the development of congitive processes in one
individual IS life follows the same course as the historical development of
these processes from generation to generation within a culture overlong
periods of time, he argues that the best mode of access to behaviours that
have become fossilised in the history of a culture is to return to their
source in the development of the individual and reconstruct them as they
are manifested in her/his performance.
19
liThe fossilised form is the end of the thread that
ties the present to the past, the higher stages of
development to the primary ones." (Ibid, p. 64).
The study of the evolution of the structures underlying · performance
becomes a better mode of access to the problem of the mind-culture issue:
development becomes the arena for insight into the "inner nature" of the
mind-culture relationship embedded in a particular behaviour.
The focus away from manifest performance towards a historically situated
view of the generative processes underlying performance entails a shift of
emphasis from analysis of psychological process as fixed, stable objects
to 11 analysis of processes, which requires a dynamic display of the
main points making up the processes I history." (Ibid, p, 61). The basic
task of research becomes a reconstruction of each stage in the development
of the process: the process must be turned back to its initial stages.
In the developmental paradigm each manifest performance is seen as a
moment in the developmental history of the individual.
"The significance of these states lies not
manifest form but in the comparison of
states as they become transformed within






Having excluded the possibility of viewing mind and culture as separate
systems and then systematically varying culture to observe the effect on
cognition, the developmental method prefers to look at particular examples
of the unitary mind-culture system in action within a particular culture.
The research problem then becomes not how mind varies as a function of
culture, but how the two phenomena simultaneously react to and generate
each other in the process of their mutual transformation.
r
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In this new frame of reference cross-cultural psychology becomes not the
comparison of how people in other cultures do their tricks - as advocated
by the exponents of cultural relativity. Within the developmental
paradigm the issue is to understand how we do our tricks (Miller, 1984).
We look to other cultures simply because we may be so enmeshed in our own
frame of reference that we are unable to see the way in which mind and
culture interact in every aspect of our experience.
"There is only one way of seeing one's O\'Jn spectacles
clearly : that is to take them off. It is impossible
to focus both on them and through them at the same
t ime ." (Toulmin, quoted in Miller and Craig, 1984, p.
14) .
Thus whereas the experimental paradigm is predominantly cross-cultural,
development being of secondary interest, the developmental paradigm
focusses predominantly on development, its cross-cultural aspect being a
methodological strategy to IItake off one's spectacles. 1I
2. TOWARDS A THEORY-METHOD OF CHANGE: PIAGET AND VYGOTSKY
21
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Two problems with the experimental method are particularly relevant to
this study: the problem of task equivalence, a methodological issue, and
the learning paradox, a conceptual issue. The work of Piaget - probably
the greatest exponent of the developmental method - takes the first steps
towards an approach that avoids these pitfalls. In a later section it
will be argued that,with regard to the learning paradox, Piaget fails to
take his insights far enough, and we turn to Pascual-Leone for a theory-
method which better accommodates Piaget 's seminal insights.
2.1 The problem of task equivalence
The problem of task equivalence arises as a direct result of traditional
cross-cultural psychology's assigning of mind and culture to different
sides of the M= f(C) equation as dependent variable and independent
variable respectively. If the independent variable, culture, is
systematically varied, the nature of the task must remain constant in
order to draw conclusions about mind. If the variation in the independent
variable consists of subjects from different cultures; the task must be
equally familiar to each group of subjects in order to draw conclusions
about the performance across these different groups of subjects. For
example, if one compares the performance of children from the Namib desert
to Eskimo children on snow-survival techniques, the fact that Eskimos
perform better doesn't point to the fact that Eskimos have superior
abilities to Namibians, but simply that the Namibians are less familiar
and less experienced at snow-survival.
The problem of establishing tasks that are equally familiar in the
cultures to be compared is widely acknowledged (Cole and Means, 1981;
Brislin et al, 1975). The LCHC refers to this problem as 11 the
conundrum blocking cross-cultural comparisons ll , and one which is 11 at
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the heart of methodological disputes in cross-cultural research." (1982,
p. 687).
This problem is not an issue for a methodology that looks at change within
a culture rather variation between cultures (Miller, 1984). Piaget,
instead of regarding mind and culture as separate systems, and then
looking at variation in performance between cultures, looks at mind and
culture as two aspects of a unitary system, locked in an ongoing process Y,
of mutual transformation.
One of Piaget's most important contributions to developmental psychology
is his insight that this transformation process consists of overcoming
constraints which take the form of old familiar ways of looking at the
world - in favour of increasingly sophisticated and unfamiliar ways.
"Non-balance produces the driving
development. Without this, knowledge
static .... It is therefore evident that
source of progress is to be sought in
insufficiency responsible for the conflict








Piaget's insight in developmental psychology is similar to the Marxist
insight that contradiction or conflict and its resolution, is the
fundamental mechanism at work in the process of history or change. liThe
given state of affairs is negative, and can be rendered positive only by
liberating the possibilities immanent in it" (Marcuse, 1973, p. 315). The
essence of transformation or change is the resolution of contraditions
(Georgoudi, 1983).
In order to examine the overcoming of constraints - or how children
proceed to master the unfamiliar - it is necessary to use unfamiliar tasks
as the process of development consists of the child's successful
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confrontation of increasingly complex unfamiliar tasks: unavoidable
milestones along the journey to competent adulthood.
Not only must the tasks be unfamiliar, they should also be misleading,
according to Miller.
li The key to Piagetls method lies in his extraordinary
insight that young children consistently give
wrong answers to certain kinds of questions. The
young childls understanding of the world is
constrained by a reliance on familiar but misleading
perceptual cues. When children are able to overcome
the compelling nature of these cues, change or
development occurs ." (Miller, 1984, pp. 17 - 18).
Thus · the problem of establishing task equivalence is a non-issue for the
developmental approach. In the light of these observations, the
experimental method of testing how well children can do the things they
know how to do is shown up as an ineffective tool for investigating
development.
2.2 The learning paradox
liThe subject's production of a given acquired
behaviour is frequently attributed to previous
learning even though (i) the behaviour in question has
never before been produced by the subject, (ii) such a
behaviour is complex and improbable enough not to have
beenproduced by 'chance."." (Pascual-Leone, 1976c, p,
94) .
Explaining cognitive development or mind in terms of culture or learning
as Cole and the LCHC do leads to the learning paradox: It is not possible
to explain a child's spontaneous solution of a problem for the first time
in terms of learning - for the child cannot know how to solve the problem ~
unless she/he has learned how to do it already.
To avoid this paradox, some factor other than learning must be posited to
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account for what Pascual-Leone calls the truly novel performances, that is
"... behaviour which is neither mere transfer of
learning or novel integration of pre-existent learned
units, nor innately determined." (Ibid, p. 94). ~
~.---....
Truly novel performance entails the child's overcoming and compelling
nature of familiar but misleading cues, in favour of more complex and
unfamiliar cues more appropriate to the task at hand - and this process
constitutes development .
In the following sections the views of Piaget andVygotsky are discussed.
Both posit a maturational developmental f act or in dynamic int eract ion wi t!)
learning. They refer to this factor as "development".
2.3 Piaget on Learning and Development
At the outset it must be emphasised that Piaget was an epistemologist
rather than a child psychologist. His primary concern was the development
of logico-mathematical thought, and not the development of children - he
was interested in children only insofar as they threw light on the problem
of the genesis of knowledge. Piaget sees the development of knowledge as
the ' evolution of increasingly complex psychological structures: the
emergence of which coincides with developmental stages in the child's
life. At each stage there is an extension, reconstruction and surpassing
of the structures of the preceding one.
The integration of successive structures , each of which leads to the
emergence of the subsequent one, makes it possible to divide the child's
development into stages and SUb-stages which can be characterised as
follows: (1) Their order of succession is constant , although the average
ages at which they occur may vary with the individual according to his/her
degree of intell igence or with the social milieu.
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(2) Each stage is
characterised by an overall structure in terms of which the main behaviour
patterns can be explained.
and non-interchangeable.
(3) These overall structures are "integrative
Each stage results from the preceding one,
integrating it as a subordinate structure, and prepares for the subsequent
one, into which it is sooner or later itself integrated (Piaget and
Inhelder, 1969, p. 72).
Pascual-Leone cha(acterises Piaget's method as the search for genetic-
epistemological sequences. Such a sequence is defined as lithe congruent
pairing of a psychogenetic and psycho-logical sequence", where:
i) a psychogenetic sequence is a sequence of tasks obtained by ordering
the tasks in terms of the developmental trace shown by the
performance score they elicit from different age-group samples; and
ii) a psycho-logical sequence of tasks is obtained by ordering the tasks
according to psycho-logical inclusion relations, that is, task B is
ordered after task A whenever its underlying constructive process
presupposes the constructive process of A (Pascual-Leone et al.
1980, p. 266).
Progress from stage to stage involves the child's acquisition of
increasingly complex psycho-logical structures. The regulatory process
which is responsible for the child's transition from stage to stage,
constituting cognitive growth , involves the two processes of learning and
development, and their integrating principle - the internal regulatory
principle which Piaget calls equilibration.
According. to Piaget, development is a spontaneous process linked to





outlines four general factors involved in mental development: The first
three factors are organic growth, experience and social transmission.
Organic growth is the biological maturational component of development,
internal to the individual, which opens up possibilities for development.
These possibilities are II rei nforced" through experience and social
transmission - the "learning " components of development external to the
individual. The effect of these three factors are integrated by a fourth
factor: equilibration, a dynamic force that serves to produce successive
states of equilibrium within the cognitive system.
Piaget described equilibration as
"A process of equilibrium, in the sense of self-
regulation; that is, a series of active compensations
on the part of the subject in response to external
disturbances and an adjustment that is both
retroactive (loop systems or feedbacks) and
anticipatory, constituting a permanent system of
compensations." (Piaget and Inhelder, 1969, p. 74).
Central to the notion of equilibration are the processes of accommodation
(the adaptation of internal cognitive structures to incorporate external
elements or events) and assimilation (the incorporation of external
elements or events into already existing internal cognitive schemes).
Equilibrium maintains an organised balance of reciprocal assimilation and
accommodation and compensates for internal and external imbalances, and in
so doing reaches ever more advanced stages of organisation; in other words
bringing about progress from one developmental stage to another.
Piaget (1977) details three different forms of equilibration. The first
is the fundamental interaction of subject and objects, of the subject's
intrinsic ~enerative structures and the external world. This is 11 the
equilibration between the assimilation of schemes of action and the
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accommodation of these objects." (p. 9). The second form involves the
interaction of the resulting sub-systems, and the third involves the
establishment of a hierarchy of these sub-systems in relation to the
totality of the subject's knowledge about the world.
Piaget outlines the interaction of development and learning thus:
"Maturation , as regards the cognitive functions,
simply determines the range of possibilities at a
specific age. It does not cause the actualisation of
structur~. Maturation simply indicates whether or not
the construction of a specific structure is possible
at a specific age. It does not itself contain a
preformed structure, but simply opens up possibil ities
- the new rea 1ity sti 11 has to be .constructed. 11
(Piaget, 1970, p. 193).
It is the equilibration processes, mediating between maturation on the one
hand, and experience and social transmission on the other hand, that
engineer this construction of reality.
The concept of equilibration points to the mental structures and functions
that generate intelligent behaviour, through the successive stages that
constitute the development of logico-mathematical thought. For this
reason Piaget's theory of equilibration can be interpreted in terms of
intrinsic generative mechanisms (Craig, 1985).
The focus on generative mechanisms is the first . requirement for an
adequate theory of change. The second requirement is also accommodated by
the theory of equilibration : the necessity of viewing change in terms of
the ongoing resolution of successive contradictions.
liThe internal reinforcements we call equilibration or
self-regulation are what enable the subject to
.el imi nat e contradictions, incompatibilitiesand
conflicts. All development is composed of momentary
conflicts and incompatibilities which must be overcome
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to reach a higher level of equilibrium. 1I (Piaget and
Inhelder, 1969, p. 78).
Pascual-Leone (1980) provides a concrete example of the cognitive conflict
present in Piaget's substance conservation task1 - an example of a
misleading situation containing potential error factors which .must be
overcome by the developing child in order to correctly solve the task.
The two error factors that operate here are:
1) an overlearned habitual structure that equates the size of the
perceptual surface with amount of substance.
2) the tendency of the child to respond to the dominant perceptual
features of a situation rather than tackling it on a conceptual
level.
IIThese error factors turn conservation tasks (and
many other problem-solving situations) into mental
teasers or (unconscious) cognitive conflicts where the
correct solution (strategy X) to the problem must
assert i tsel f, if it can, against the strong
interference provided by error-factor-facilitated
wrong solutions (strategies Y).II (Ibid., p. 273)
It is the equilibration process that enables the variety of X strategies
mastered by the developing organism to prevail over the Ystrategies.
However, although Piaget's method seems to offer the possibility of a
theory of development that adequately accommodates the notion of change,
two criticisms have been levelled at him which are of particular relevance
to this study. The first crit icism often levelled against Piaget's notion
of equilibration is its limited "explanatory scope" (~1oessinger, 1978 , p.
264). Rowel 1 (1983) described equilibration, the hard core of Piaget's
programme, as an "ar-tt cIe of faith ", simply accepted by Piagetians as a
necessary . foundation for their formulations, and never adequately
explicated . .The next chapter will examine Pascual-Leone's critique of the
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notion of equilibration as an incomplete explanation of the process of
change in the developing child. He argues that although Piaget takes
important steps towards solving the learning paradox, and the problem of
truly novel performance, he does not effect such a solution. Pascual-
Leone seeks to II stand on Piaget's shoulders ll , using his insights as
guidelines for a neo-Piagetian programme better equipped to deal with
change. It is this programme that gUides the present research.
The second criticism of Piaget deals with the fact that although _he
acknowledges the importance of social and cultural factors (Piaget, 1966),
his theory does not attempt to explain how these factors influence
development. He looks at the i nt r i nsic psychological processes that
generate performance, simply taking as given that it occurs in a social
context (Craig, 1985). This review now turns to Vygotsky's notion of the
interaction between learning and development, with a view to examining his
focus on the constraints externaL to the individual which govern cognitive
development - a focus which complements Piaget's focus on internal 1
generative mechanisms (Ibid).
2.4 Vygotsky on Learning and Development
Like Piaget, Vygotsky sees development as the integration of learning and
maturational elements. However, his emphasis is different from Piaget's.
Piaget focuses on the individual constraints on development. His interest
lies in the epistemic subject, which Craig (1985) defines as 11 the o>
description or explanation of the human potential to construct logico-
mathematical knowledge,and the development of the necessary structures
and the functions for tni s ;" (Ibid, p. 27). In spite of his
acknowledgement that learn ing plays an important role in development,
Piaget's main focus is 011 the IIprocessing organismic constraints ll of the
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subject and his methods 11 ••• minimise learning and maximise conceptual
problem solving, while generating a large family of often interrelated
genetic-epistemological sequences ." (Pascual-Leone, 1980, p.267). Thus
Piaget is interested in the universal capacities of individuals to acquire
the structures of logico-mathematical thought. These are conditions
internal to the individual, 11 ••• those characteristics that the structures "';
of all subjects of the same developmental level have in common. " (Vuyk,
1980, p, 52).
Vygotsky's focus, by contrast, is on IIMind in Soc i ety", the title of his
important work (1978). He looks at development not in the context of the
epistemic subject, but of the social actor, defined by Craig as follows:
"Tne social actor is an individual who acts, and is
socialised to act, in a particular socio-historical
. context who must meet the demands of a reality which
already exists in some form before that individual life
can take its course ." (Craig, 1985, p. 13).
For Vygotsky psychological functions appear first inter-psychologically or
between people - initially the child is regulated from outside by some
informed other person, usually the mother. Only later are these functions ~
internalised as intra-psychological functions. Thus whereas in Piaget's
theory equilibration plays the central role in cognitive growth, mediating
between learning and development, and steering the child from one stage to
the next, . in Vygotsky1s theory culture becomes the steering principle of
regulation. For Piaget the process of regulation is an internal,
biological process.
external mediator.
For Vygotsky it is a social process, \involving an
According to Vygotsky, the interaction between learning and development,
or between . chi.ld and adult , takes place in the "Zone of Proximal
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Deve Iopment 11 • Th is ' is the distance between the 11actua I deve Iopmenta I
level" or functions which have already matured (end products of
development) and the "l evel of potential development" or functions which
are currently in a state of formation and can be exercised under adult
guidance. Thus this Zone defines those functions which "... are in the
process of maturation; functions that will mature tomorrow but are
currently in an embryonic state ... the 'buds' or 'flowers' of development
rather than the 'fruits' of development." (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 86).
Thus in reconstructing the origin and course of development, Vygotsky's
theory points ·towards the notion of instruction, or cultural transmission,
as the interface between mind and culture. Learning awakens a variety of
internal developmental processes which operate only when a child is
interacting with other persons in his/her environment. These processes
are internalised and thus does development occur.
"Properly organised learning results in mental
development, and sets in motion a variety of
developmental processes that would be impossible apart
from learning developmental processes do not
coincide with learning processes. Rather, the
developmental process lags behind the learning
process; this sequence then results in zones of
proximal development." (Ibid, p, 90).
The zone of proximal development is thus _the interface between mind and
culture, in the sense that it is here that mind and culture interact.
Vygotsky regards it as 11 ••• the fundamental unit of a psychology that is
essentially human and intrinsically soct al ." (Miller and Craig, 1985, p.
3). Vygotsky's mode of access to this interface is what he calls his
experimental-developmental method, which "... artificially provokes or
creates a process of psychological development." (1978, p. 61). This
method aims to expose the processes that generate development or change by
reconstructi~g the processes that regUlate the mind-culture transactions
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within the zone.
Vygotsky discusses the zone of proximal development in the context of
school learning, pointing to the idea that "schooling is a social
institution that articifially provokes and creates psychological
development; artificial in the sense that it is not a natural phenomenon,
but a human or cultural artifact." (~1iller and Craig, '1985, pp 6 - 7).
2.5 The Theory-Method of Rational Reconstruction
Vygotsky's focus on the external ("learning" or "culture") constraints on
the social actor, Piaget's focus on the internal ("mind" or "development"
constraints of the epistemic subject may be regarded as parallel to ~
Bhaskar's social and psychological dimensions respectively. In this light
they are the two moments of his "linking science of socio-psychology"
unfolding in the transformational (Bhasker, 1979) or transactional
(Miller, 1984) interaction between the cultural and cognitive systems.
The means of access to these transformations or transactions is already
implicit in the respective theory-methods of Piaget and Vygotsky. This
section spells out more explicitly the notion of generative mechanisms or
enabling conditions. These are the "deep structures" of the unitary mind-
culture system at the heart of these transformations or transactions which
are responsible for the manifest performance of the developing child. It
is these generative mechanisms that constitute change, and which are
elaborated by Pascual-Leone in his explication of Piaget's notion of
equilibration in terms of generative and psychogenetic constructivity
(Pascual-Leone and Goodman, 1979) which together constitute the ability
of the psychological organism to undergo change.
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Chomsky coined the term "generative" to describe the structures of his
"transformational grammar", the system of deep structures underlying
language.
"Though the surface structures of Ianguages differ
Noam Chomsky and others claim that · the 'deep
structure I . underlying them is to a large extent
common. Transformational grammar has as its task the
uncovering of the deep structure of language, and the
rules according to which this structure is transformed
into the surface structures of various languages." (De
Georges and De Georges, 1972, p. xx ) .
Harre and Secord (1972) outline a methodology to investigate the deep
structures of huma~ behaviour in a social context. Their aim is to
provide "a methodology out of a general theory of social action and its
genesis", as an alternative to the experimental or positi vist approach
~
which is still adhered to in many circles "long after the theoretical
justification for it, in naive behaviorism, has been repudiated." (p. 1).
Harre and Secord look to the methodology of the advanced sciences and find
two pointers which guide them in their search for a more appropriate
methodology for the social sciences. The first pointer is the notion that
the scientist1s task is the rational explanation of non-random patterns ~ l
"' -
through the discovery of the mechanisms that generate such patterns.
"There is no simple · route to discovering such
mechanisms. Some may be simply inspected; others are
only quasi-accessible. But in the f irst instance, our
ideas of most generative mechanisms come from a
disciplined use of the i~agination. The use of
analogy through the key concept of model is important
here, for it is analogies which control the
imagination so that models are plausible analogies of
the unknown, causal mechanisms that produce the known
non-random patterns of phenomena," (Harre and Secord,
1972, p. 6).
The second poioter is the perception that modern physics is increasingly
based on the conceptions of power and potentialities, which can also be
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app~ied to humans. The ascription of a power to a person or thing
involves the notion of enabling conditions which produce a state of
"readiness" for the exercise of the power or potentiality.
''J
Intrinsic
enabling conditions are marked off from other circumstances surrounding
the possession and exercise of powers because of their 11 connection
criteria of identity of the individuals who have the powers - thus, powers
are related to the essential nature of things and people." (Ibid, p. 6).
The ascription of powers is characterised in the following formula:
If C
1
, C2, C3, ... , Cn' then 8, if N.
C refers to circumstances in the environment which make a behaviour
possible, B represents the behaViour, and N the intrinsic enabling
conditions (Ibid, p. 18).
For the purposes of this review, these intrinsic enabling conditions (N)
may be interpreted as the internal constraints of Piaget's epistemic
subject. C then becomes the extrinsic constraints on Vygotsky's social
actor, or the extrinsic enabling conditions. In this framework the task
of the psychologist becomes the identification of the intrinsic and
extrinsic generative mechanisms that are united in the process of
development, and which are the vehicles of change.
According to Harre and Secord, the search for generative mechanisms should
lead the researcher 11 in social life to find a 'deep structure'
someth i ng like the deep structure Chomsky fi nds in language.11 (Ibid, p,
12). It is in the deep structures of mind and culture locked in a process
of generative constructions (in Bhaskar's transformational dimension, or
Miller's transactional dimension), which must be explicated in order to
comprehend development. Pascual-Leone1s work is an attempt at a II rat ional
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reconstruction " (1976c. p. 90) of the intrinsic generative mechanisms.
Bhaskar (1979) suggests that the most fruitful way to investigate the
generative mechanisms responsible for change is to look at societies
involved in rapid social change. because "... in period of transition or
crisis generative structures. previously opaque. become more visible."
Such an approach provides 11 a partial analogue to the role played by
experimentation in natural science." (p. 61).
It is this rationale that informs the present research's choice of Zu lu-
speaking schoolchildren. performing an unfamiliar and western-orientated
task (the FIT). as a means of access to the generative mechanisms of mind
and culture interlocked in the process of development. Along the lines of
Vygotsky's experimental-developmental method it attempts to qrtificially
provoke or create a miniscule process of psychological development - the
acquisition. through experience. of the executives necessary for
successful performance on the FIT. and in so doing support Pascual-Leone's
hypothesis about the interaction of learning/culture (in this case the
acquisition of the particular executives necessary for success on the FIT)
and development/mind (a developmental. maturational ~-factor). This
hypothesis is dealt with in detail in the next chapter.
Craig and Miller (1984) refer to the encounter of Zulu-speaking African
children with the requirements of a "western-industrialised-urban-
technological-schooled society" as part of the process of resolution of
African and western forms. through socialisation and transformation (terms
from Bhaskar's model discussed earlier).
"Formal schooling is an example of a western social
f?rm that is valued throughout Africa. A major
hIghway to western technology is through the school
system and those that travel this route have the
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option to select those aspects of western culture that
are useful and to reject what may be inappropriate in
other situations. But many children throughout the
world become 'vittims' of this historically recent and
unique system of transmitting information. Psychology
is painfully aware of its limited contribution to
understanding the enabling conditions that ease the
way for children to adapt to this foreign agency. 11
(Craigand Miller, 1984).
The present research is an investigat ion of these enabling conditions,
motivated by the notion that insight into their structure and functions
must inform any attempt to transform the learning environment of children




1. In the substance conservation problem two balls of plasticine of
. identical shape and size (A and 8) are shown to the child. Then ball
8 is rolled on the table into a sausage-like shape 81, The child is
asked whether or not the amounts of substance found in A and 81 are
equal. This problem is generally solved at about 7 years of age.
(Pascual-Leone, 1980).




Pascual-Leone uses the ideas of Piaget as the foundation stone for his
Theory of Constructive Operators (Pascual-Leone, 1970, 1976a, 1976b,
1976c, 1976d, 1976e, 1978, 1980, Pascual-Leone and Goodman 1979, Pascual-
Leone et aI 1978, Pascual-Leone and Smith 1969, Pascual-Leone and
Sparkman, 1980). He speaks of two aspects of Piaget's theory (1978):
1) his expIici-c psychological theory, encompassing his characterisation
of the stages and equilibration, and
2) his genet i:::;-epistomologicaI theory, which is 11 an empiricaU y
based constructive rationalist methodology, ie, a set of gUidelines
along whic h different psychological theories of cognitive and
personality development could be bui l t ;" (2.244).
He claims that Piaget fails to provide an adequate psychological theory.
His account of the stages and equilibration are valid only at the level of
descriptive st17ucturaI theory, that is insofar as they refer to empirical
invariants in the data base. However, they fail at the process structural
level, in other words they are incapable of accounting for the step-by-
step temporal unfolding of the subject's behaviour (1976c). This means
they are incapable of accounting for change, or the developing child's
ability for truly novel performance.
For this reason he prefers to include the concepts of equilibration and
the stages as ~art of Piaget's IIheuristic ll metatheory (Pascual-Leone et
aI, 1978, p. 244) which he adopts as a foundation for his Theory of
Constructive Operators (TCO). Considering Piaget's genetic epistomology,
his stages and equilibration as a metatheory, allows Pascual-Leone to
remain within Piaget's framework while elaborating a new psychological
approach. The Tea, his neoPiagetian theory of cognitive development,
formulates' explicit constructs to account for the step-by-step cognitive
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growth which is described by Piaget1s logico-mathematical stages and
equilibration in very general terms.
"A constructive theory functions as a conceptual
gadget capable of simulating the genesis in the
sUbject of his performances, ie capable of deriving
these data by means of a 'rational reconstruction' ...
which explains the data by way of exhibiting the
genesis of their construction." (Pascual-Leone, 1976c,
p. 90).
The TCO attacks the problems of truly novel performance by explicating
cognitive development in terms of two sorts of constructivity:
i) psychogenetic constructivity: the developmental capacity to
permanently modify the internal organisation of cognitive structures
to increase adaptation.
ii) generative constructivity: the capacity to produce moment-to-moment
performances which are truly novel.
Thus the TCO is intended as an expansion of Piaget's structuralist
framework into a working model of cognitive development which adequately
accounts for change, or "human constructivity" (the organism'S ability to
synthesise or create truly novel performances using and recombining
aspects of past experience, and its ability to permanently modify itself
as a result of the new experiences thus achieved). It has been describe d
as 11 a model of the psychological organisms which is at work inside
Piaget's 'epistemic subject' for each age group'l (Pascual-Leone et a l ,
1978, p. 271).
Pascual-Leone pinpoints two deficiencies in Piaget's system. The first is
the attempt to make one descriptive-structural model, eqUilibration, the
cause (ie the generative and psychogenetic constructive model) of the
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other descriptive structural mode, the stages, when in fact "both £o-exist
as structural aspects of the data baseI' (1980, p. 275). The second is
11 the attempt to make the stage models (ie the abstract categorical
descriptions of molar empirical invariances) into causal determinants of
performance" (I bid , p. 275). Symptomatic of these deficiencies is
Piaget's failure to differentiate between learned habitual cognitive
structures and those structures that result from the equilibration
processes - truly novel performances, and the spontaneous construction of
correct performances for logical-structural tasks such as conservations
when they are solved for the first time. On this first time performance
cannot be explained in terms of a learned habitual structure without
falling into the snares of the learning paradox.
To resolve this paradox, Pascual-Leone posits situation-free organismic
factors or "constructive operators ll , which he calls silent operators.
These factors are process- structurally different to Piaget's cognitive
structures or schemes. Through their dynamic effect on schemes, these
organismic factors , in interaction, account for the developing child's
constructivity.
In the light of Piaget's description of cognitive growth, novel
performance is seen as an integration or co-ordination of existing learned
or innate structures or schemes. Pascual-Leone, on the other hand, speaks
of t r uLy novel performance which transcends already learned knowledge, and
represents a qualitative break from already learned schemes in the sense
that the integration is the result of a higher form of abstraction than
the integration underlying novel performances (Craig, 1985). A truly
novel performance is neither the result of applying a habitual (~ learned
or innate) st~ucture or scheme nor the result of a novel integration of
habitual learned structures by means of a hablOtual integration-rule
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structure which is situation-specific.
"In a truly novel performance the integration of
habitual schemes occurs serendipitously, without a
habitual rule-integration scheme, as a result of
hidden interactions among situation-free organismic
processes - the silent operators and basic
principles." (Pascual-Leone and Goodman, 1979, p.
308) •
Craig ascribed the possibility of this serendipitous achievement of truly
novel performance to the power of the metasubject1s intrinsic generative
mechanisms "... to achieve greater levels of abstraction than are
available in the immediate data from action performed on objects and the
integration from knowledge thus gained." (1985, p. 77).
Pascual-Leone's theory of the functional structure of a metasubject -
which adequately explicates the metasubject's ability to overcome the
constraints of learning from past and present contexts to achieve truly
novel performance - qualifies as an adequate model for a general
psychological theory of change (Craig and Miller, 1984).
The most important situation-free organismic process, which plays a
pivotal role in truly novel performance is the ~-operator, the reserve of
mental energy which increases quantitatively in power with age. The M-
operator originated as a deductive/inductive inference stemming from
analyses of the i nformational complexity of Piagetian tasks (Goodman,
1979, p. 2). These analyses revealed a quantitative pattern in the
transition from one qualitative Piagetian stage to another. Tasks
typically solved at a particular substage of development were found to be
of the same "dimensionality", that is they involved the consideration and
co-ordination of t he same minimum number of schemes. This suggested the
~-operator to Pa5cual-Leone: a mental energy mechanism that determines the
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attending to and integration of task-relevant information. As the power
of M increases the number of schemes the child can apply increases and
hence more complex problems can be solved. Thus with suitable
experience/learning quantitative growth leads to qualitative change from
one developmental stage to the next. ~ imposes limits to learning, and
increases in Mmake structural cognitive growth possible. However Malone
does not cause this growth as suitable experience is also necessary.
Pascual-Leone offers the silent operators as a solution to the st~ge
transition problem in Piaget 's theory which is inadequately explicated by
the notion of equilibration. They are. posited as the quantitative element
underlying the equilibration process which carry the child from one stage
to the next. The developmental growth of Mis the "transition rule" for
passing from one Piagetian cognitive stage to the next" (Pascual-Leone and
Goodman, 1979, p. 319).
liThe ability to cope with increasing informational
complexity is for Piaget a by-product of the main
developmental factor-the structural stage level
attained by the child. · Pascual-Leone, by contrast,
proposes that quantititive increases in the ability to
cope with informational complexity are primary and
these increases (together with experience) generate
structural growth" (Goodman, 1979, p, 4).
The growth of Mis seen as a maturational process, working in intimate
interaction with experience. It must be stressed that Mis simply a store ~
of energy. M does not constitute the structure in itself. Its
quantitative increase simply opens up the possibility of the development
of a more complex structure as the child progresses f rom one stage to the
next. This possibility is actualised by the interaction of the other
silent operators and schemes which are boosted by~. This process will be
the subject of a later section.
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3. 1 The Three Principles of the Tea
Pascual-Leone's view of the developing individual on which the Tea is
based can be formulated in three principles:
(1) the Principle of Assimilatory Praxis;
(2) the Principle of Equilibration; and
(3) the Principle of Bilevel Psychological Organisation.
He refers to the psychological organisation of the developing child as the
metasubject or "... the silent (unconscious) organisation of functional
structures or 'psychological machinery' underlying the subject's activity"
(Pascual-Leone and Goodman, 1979, p. 303).
3.1.1 Principle of Assimilatory Praxis
The metasubject is a highly active organism which engages ~n praxis, or
goal-directed activity, addressed at the subject's external world.
Situation-specific activities have an external referent and are
manifestations of schemes or subjective operators stored in the
metasubject. The notion of schemes is taken from Piaget and refers to an
organised set of actions which can be transferred from one situation to
another, by assimilation of the second to the first. Assimilation refers
to the "rushing-to-apply" tendency of schemes: unless prevented by some
incompatible and dominant scheme, they will rush to apply in accordance
with their rules under minimal conditions of satisfaction (Pascual-Leone
et aZ, 1978, p. 269).
Pascual-Leone's extension of Piaget's notion of schemes concerns the
problem of how choice among schemes is possible. How does it come about
that a dynamic choice takes place within the metasubject, leading some
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schemes to apply and stopping many others from doing so, rather than the
metasubject simply "jamming" up with a multiplicity of schemes rushing to
apply under minimal conditions of satisfaction? The choice between
schemes is determined by silent operators, the set of organismic factors
hidden (ie silent) inside the organism. These silent operators determine
which of a potentially applicable range of schemes should apply by
boosting or weighting relevant schemes, and inhibiting or de-boosting the
application of others.
liThe subjective operators and silent operators which
comprise the metasubject together construct (ie cause)
the praxis of the subject" (Pascual-Leone and Goodman,
1979, p, 304).
3.1.2 Principle of EqUilibration
Pascual-Leone (Pascual-Leone and Goodman, 1979, p. 304) reformulates
Piaget's principle of equilibration as the metasubject's tendency, as a
result of its activity, to spontaneously undergo enduring structural
changes that pursue three goals:
I/(a) maximise the internaL consistency among its
functional parts, (b) maximise adaptation (functional
payoff) in its dealings with the environment, ie
maximise the number of different types of situations
with which the organism can successfully interact
without having to learn (ie to change its internal
structures), and (c) minimise i nt er nal complexity
(organic . structural cost) in its organisations, ie
organise its psychogenetic and generative constructive
processes in such a manner that (a) and (b) are
satisfied with a minimum of learned and innate
resources 1/ (Ibid, p. 304).
In the Piagetian tradition, (a) is a substantive organismic disposition
that increases with development. Sub-principles (b) and (c) account for
i) the generative constructivity of the metasubject in its I/here and howl/
adaptation - its ability to produce generative constructions or truly
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novel performances from its constitutents; and ii) the psychogenetic
constructivity demonstrated by the metasubject in its learning and
development - its engagement in structural growth (differentiation and co-
ordination of structures) which cannot be predicted by its generative
constructive capability alone, nor by maturation alone, but as a result of
the dialectical interactions between them (Ibid).
It is to explain sub-principles (b) and (c) that the Tea posits the silent
operators. These are discussed in the next section.
3.1.3 Principle of Bilevel Psychological Organisation
The schemes or subjective operators and the silent operators form two
levels of the metasubject. These levels are strongly hierarchically
organised in two, functionally and structurally different interacting
systems.
liThe first level or subjective system is constituted
by situat ion-specific constructs (organismic schemes)
which apply on the input to categorise and/or modify
it: the second-level or siZent system is constructed
by situation free metaconstructs (basic factors and
basic principZes) which apply on the first-level
constructs (not on the input) to modify their
activation weights (ie assimilatory strength) in
accordance with organismic requirements11 (Pascual-
Leone and Goodman, 1979, p. 306).
Whereas the metasubject's repertoire of schemes form a II s it uat ion-specif ic
semantic~pragmatic automation ", silent operators form a higher-order
system organised according to "little-known dialectic or context-sensitive
laws 11 (Pascual-Leone, 1976 97)c, p. . Pascual-Leone mentions Freud's
principle of unconscious overdetermination of behaviour as a possible
analogy for the as yet unexplicated functioning of this system.
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3.2 The Theory of Constructive Operators
The Theory of Constructive Operators will now be discussed in more detail
under the following three headings: 1) Schemes, 2) The field of
activation, 3) Silent operators.
3.2.1 Schemes
Through learning the metasubject comes to have a large and ever-changing
repertoire of schemes which reflect all sorts of invariances it has
encountered in its interaction with the environment. This constitutes the
subject's repertoire of permanently stored knowledge units. Pascual-Leone
characterises schemes as "semantic-pragmatic" insofar as each one consists
of a bundle of pragmatically relevant blueprints correspo~ding to
expectations, actions, percepts, beliefs, plans or affects. For any
scheme "... these blueprints can be elicited by features which confirm the
scheme as a semantic truth-function would" (1976c, p. 96). Structurally
all schemes have the same form: if a set of conditions is minimally
satisfied by the input from the environment or the subject1s internal
state, the scheme will tend to apply (unless another more dominant scheme
prevents its application). When it applies, the set of effects
(blueprints) which it carries are used by the metasubject to further or
modify its ongoing activities.
There are three different kinds of schemes, distinguished mainly by their
effects:
i) Affective schemes: These generate two sorts of effects:
physiological reactions (eg blushing, sweating) and motivational
effects (eg fear, ambition). The latter in turn generate affective
goals which in turn bring about the activation of corresponding
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schemes.
ii) Cognitive schemes: These include both figurative and operative
schemes, which are action schemes which can implement into
performance the plan of an executive scheme. Figurative schemes are
predicates that have the effect of representing objects and events.
Operative schemes have the effect of changing the mental or physical
objects they represent.
iii) Executive schemes: These are epistemologically complex and general
operative schemes which specify general-purpose plans of action for
procedures to accomplish a given task. These procedures are then
implemented through the application of specific task relevant
figurative and operative schemes which satisfy their plan.
Executive schemes mediate. between motives (affect-defined goals) and
other cognitive schemes, co-ordinating their combination and
temporal sequence to produce a complex goal-directed performance.
3.2.2 The Field of Activation
Regardless of their functional type, from a structural point of view,
Pascual-Leone suggests that all schemes are of the same form: they have a
releasing component (rc), an effecting component (ec) and a terminal
component (tc). The releasing component consists of a set of potential
cues or conditions which govern the scheme's activation. When features of
an input match at least one condition of the scheme, they cue or release
the scheme. Each condition of the rc causes a II cont ent activation weight ll
determined in part on the basis of innate saliency factors (ie how salient
in a psychophysical sense is the feature matching the condition) and in
part on the basis of "Iearned" saliency factors (ie how important is the
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condition to the scheme) . . The local degree of activation of the scheme is
given by the sum of a set of weights of satisfied (ie activated)
conditions. This is the TeO·s "l ocal cue function rule" for scheme
activation (Pascual-Leone and Goodman, 1979, p. 308). , The effecting
component causes the effect or consequence of the scheme, and the terminal
component specifies its outcome, should it be realised.
Any performance produced by a subject results from the metasubjective
application of schemes. At any particular moment, a set of schemes from
the total repertoire of schemes is active, by virtue of the local cue
function. This set of schemes is called the initial field of activation.
Adistinction needs to be made between the activation and application of a
scheme. Not all activated schemes actually produce performance - only
those which are compatible and dominant in activation strength come to
apply. Each one of these dominant schemes shares in the shaping of
,
performance, while other schemes which are weaker and incompatible will be
prevented from applying. This law is called the Principle of Schematic
Over-determination of Performance or SOP.
The SOP criterion of dominance is organismically defined. The local cue
function rule explains how silent choices are made between potentially
applicable schemes in a limited number of cases only. However this rule
is obviously not an adequate explanation of truly novel performance which
cannot be explained in terms of learned schemes. The initial degree of
activation of schemes is modified by the silent operators, and it is the
terminal activation weight Of schemes, after silent operators have
applied, that determines dominance. Silent operators apply on schemes
and, via this application, construct the subject·s performance.
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3.2.3 Silent Operators
The TCO proposes seven silent operators in its account of human
constructivity: C, L, ~, I, 1, ~,A. The first four will be discussed in
this section. They are the most important for the present research as
they determine performance on the FIT (Johnson, 1982).
The learning operators: C and L
The TCO posits two types of learning: C (content) learning, which
corresponds to Piaget's notion of empirical experience, and l (logical or
structural) learning that corresponds to Piaget1s notion of logico-
mathematical experience (Pascual-Leone et aI, 1978). C and L learning
account for the differentiation of schemes through experience, and the
corresponding f and loperators formalise the increase in assimilatory
power that a scheme derives as a result of its differentiation. C
learning takes place whenever a single scheme differentiates by expanding
its set of conditions and/or effects, thereby increasing its activation
weight, or effectiveness as a scheme booster.
This expansion may take place by means of i) incorporating previously non-
schematised figurative or operative properties into the scheme's rc or ec,
or ii) the main scheme assimilating some functionally related scheme of a
lower assimilatory strength (ie the main scheme incorporating the rc's
and/or ecls of a subordinate scheme).
Compared to f learning which involves no change in epistemological level,
l learning creat~s "super-schemes" which reflect structural relations
among constituent schemes. It does not replace the constituents, but
rather carries information about their interrelationship - which no
particular constituent could contain.
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There are two types of 1 learning: L structuring by overlearning (LC
learning) and L structuring via Mboosting (LM learning).- --
LC learning
occurs through repeated exposure to a situational invariant, ie a set of
schemes standing in a particular structural relationship to one another.
This exposure leads to repeated co-activation of the functionally related
schemes. All the schemes involved come to acquire equally high
assimilatory strength, and slowly come to assimilate each other, forming
an LC structure. LC learning is slow, and results in structures that are
functionally interlocked with the schemes that led to their formation. As
a result they usually are not used independently of context.
LC structures constitute the subject's repertoire of experiental knowledge
or empirical experience, and weighting of If structures will facilitate
performance where previous learning is relevant to the task solution.
However, they may hinder the solution of a task requiring a novel
approach. If learning is continuous and cumulative. The LC repertoire
will expand slowly with the subject's increased and repeated exposure to a
variety of contexts. Thus the developmental course of the If factor is
smooth and gradually incremental within a stage (Goodman, 1979).
If learning is often tacit, taking place latently and without mental
effort (that is, without the application of ~ boosting to the schemes
involved). Pascual-Leone and Goodman (1979) cite instances of If learning
where the "invariant ll to be learned is too complicated to be consciously
analysed - such as Bruckner's Music Style, for example. The activation
weights of the schemes constituting the invariant are initially not equal
because their interrelationship is too complex to be worked out by
executives, and boosted by~. However with repeated exposure to these
schemes they gradually come to be equally strongly boosted, and an LC
structure is formed. "By repeated exposure to the same situation the
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network of C schemes should become denser and denser until, after some
time, a conglomerate of ~ structures would start developing" (Ibid, p.
343) •
In contrast, LM learning t3kes place when the subject is mentally aroused.
A set of schemes is simultaneously and repeatedly boosted by ~, and a
superscheme is formed which reflects them all. This learning is rapid,
and detached from context, resulting in very generalised structures
reflecting trans-situational invariances. The superscheme is functionally
equivalent to the schemes comprising it, and may replace them in
subsequent mental processes with a reduction in required mental energy.
Executive schemes are formed by way of LM learning.
LM learning is recursive (ie the LM learning process may apply on the
superschemes themselves to create superschemes of superschemes, and so
on). Its recursive nature, and the combinability of LM and ~ structures





of major significance for development and
and make accessible to the M-power of
(and adults) previously inaccessible
(Pascual-Leone and Goodman, 1979, p. 347).
There is a developmental ceiling to the quantitative complexity of
structures which may be abstracted and schematised via LM learning. This
learning is limited by the ~ power available to the subject at his/her~
particular developmental stage (Goodman, 1979).
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The F operator
The I operator is the content-free subjective cognitive field factor which
corresponds to the tendency to structure performance so as to create a
cohesive (holistic) and · subjectively salient representation of a
situation. It applies both early and late in any processing step. In its
initial application it provides the cues of schemes in the field of
activation with their innate sensorial saliency, and is known as Is
(sensorial I). Later, after all the other silent operators have applied
on the field of activation, F serves to boost schemes which generate the
most economical and structurally cohesive representation of a situation.
Here it is known as F (processing F).-p -
F will tend to correct performance in situations where perceptually
salient aspects are relevant for task solutions. Such situations are
called I-facilitating. It will tend to hinder correct performance when I
boosts perceptually salient aspects which are irrelevant of task solution
and which hinder the application of relevant schemes. (I-misleading
situations). In task situations that are misleading because of I (or 1)
boosting of irrelevant schemes, the application of ~ energy to boost
schemes relevant to task solution is essential for correct performance.
The F factor works in close association with the LC structures. "LC
structures present the structural form of compactness, consistency and
.information mirumfset ton'' and will thus tend to be weighted by I
operators. As these F-facilitated LC structures develop, the absolute
weight of F will tend to intrease in practice. Thus the developmental
course of F should follow the course of expansion of the !f repertoire of
schemes (Goodman, 1979, p. 57).
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The Moperator
M is a limited amount of mental attentional energy that can be used to
boost task-relevant schemes that are not sufficiently boosted by other
silent operators. The mobilisation and allocation of Mare carried out by
executive schemes which carry the subject's representation of the task
instructions and the corresponding plans for solving the task.
In every task situation, ~ serves to boost task-relevant aspects which are
not physically present (and, thus, must be "kept in mind"}. In t ask
situations where habitual (ie i-boosted) structures and/or highly salient
(ie I boosted) schemes are inadequate for task solution, ~ energy is
allocated to boost the activation of task-relevance schemes, leading to
correct performance, M also · serves to boost task-relevant schemes in
misleading task situations where inappropriate schemes have been boosted
by silent operators such as F and L.
The maximum number of schemes that an individual can simultaneously ~
boost is called ~ power (Mp). Maximum Mp grows throughout childhood, one
unit every other year, from e + 1 at 3 and 4 years of age to ~ + 7 at 15
years of age. lie 11 represents a constant amount of ~ energy which is
developed during the first two years of life, and later used to boost the
task executive. Table 1 lists the predicted maximum ~ power values as a
function of age, and their correspondence to the Piagetian sub-stage
sequence.
The components of Mp, ~ and ~ (~ = 1, 2, 3, ... , 7), do not refer to
structural constitutents of M, but simply to the measure of energy which
goes . respectively to the executive (~) and to other relevant k schemes.
Ilk 11 refers to ' the measure of ~ energy that increases developmentaily,
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measured in terms of the number of schemes the child can simultaneously
activate in solving a task.
However the prediction of a subject's performance on an ~-test cannot be
deduced from the subject1s age alone. The lack of a rich repertoire of
executive structures to guide the efficient application of the available M
energy (perhaps due to a poor learning enVironment) may lead to an
allocation of less than the maximum available ~ capacity in situations
requiring sophisticated executives (Miller and Pascual-Leone, 1980). This
means that funct ional ~ (the amount of ~ energy being used to produce the
performance) may not always reflect the true Mreserve power. This may
lead to individual differences in performance on a task by children at a
particular stage.
The number of schemes the subject will actually activate will also depend
on the characteristics of the tasks. If the task is too easy or well-
learned, there is no need to M-activate so many schemes. If the task is
too difficult, more schemes may be reqUired that the maximum number
available to the subject via ~-activation, causing the subject to fail.
However in such a case there may be a way out via learning (LM or 1I).
Schemes may be IIchunked ll in such a way that fewer are reqUired to solve a
well-known problem than when the problem was first encountered. In
addition, it has already been mentioned that LM learning is limited by
maturational development, whereas LC learning is not. Thus in tile case of
tasks where LC learning is involved, . it is possible to bypass
developmental constraints for the acquisition of particulat structures.
Considering all these complications it is clear that an explanation of a
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Table3.1
Predicted maximum ~ power values as a function of age. and their
correspondence to thePiagetian substage sequence.










(Pascual-Leone and Goodman . 1979. p. 324)
e+1 low preoperations
e+2 high preoperations
e+3 low concrete operations
e+4 high concrete operations
e+5 substage introductory to
formal operations
e+6 low formal operations
e+7 high formal operations
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subject's performance requires a detailed task analysis, showing the
minimum number of schemes which a subject should hold simultaneously for
the task to be solved. A task analysis evaluati ng the !i-demand of a task
and analysing the mental strategies used to solve it is called a ~
"metasubjective task analysis" (Pascual-Leone and Goodman , 1979, p. 329).
Detailed task analyses show that horizontal decalages - never adequately
explicated by Piaget (Vuyk, 1981) - such as those between the conservation
of substance, weight and volume, can often be explained by the increa~ing
M-demand of the tasks. In other cases they can be explained in terms of
facilitation or interference effects which other silent operations (f, L,
F etc) may have on the task solution.
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO M: CASEIS NEO-PIAGETIAN APPROACH TO COGNITIVE
DEVELOPMENT
Case (1974, 1978, 1980; Case and Sandlos, 1980) modifies Pascual-Leone's
theory by rejecting its developmental assumption: he claims that there is
no real growth in ~, only a reduction, with age, in the amount of ~ energy
required to boost executive schemes. -
This section examines Case's formulation of Mwhich he calls the CPC
(central processing capacity) and rejects it as a possible framework for
studying cognitive development and the respectve roles of learning and
maturational development in this process.
Like Pascual-Leone, Case recognises Piaget's stages and postulates the CPC
asa maturational factor or "general organismic factor" that controls the
child's rate of progression from one stage to the next. He explains the
CPC as the maximum number of schemes the subject can attend to at anyone
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moment without losing track of his/her overall objective. The size of the
child's current CPC limits the complexity of the executive control
structures she/he can acquire and utilise.
What causes growth of the CPC? Case rejects the TCOls claim that the
subject's total processing capacity increases as a result of a
developmental increase with age in the amount of mental energy available
to the subject, arguing instead that the measured increase in capacity
within each stage is due to a decrease in the capacity required to execute
the operations characteristic of that stage.
Case claims that the subject's CPC does not change after she/he has
w<
reached 2 years of age. From this age onwards a constant amount of energy
is involved in any mental operations. What changes with development is
the ratio of energy required to carry out the two aspects of a mental
operation: functional operational capacity (0) and functional storage
capacity (s). This idea can be symbolised thus: 0 + s = k, where .k is a
constant, equal to t he system's total processing capacity.
As the child progresses through a developmental stage, less and less
energy or "attentional control" is required to perform the basic
operations associated with that stage. This frees energy to be used for
storage of the resul ts of previous operations particularly relevant to the
task at hand. As 0 decreases, s increases, and the subject is able to
store an extra "loop" or mental operation thus progressing to a more
advanced sub-stage.
The decrease in required "attentional control" for 0 is due to the fact
that with· practice basic operations become automatic, requiring less
energy or processing space, freeing it for the aCquisition of new loops.
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(Case uses the concepts of an amount of energy and an amount of space
interchangeably in his account of the growth of the CPC). His transition
rule from one stage to another is a certain minimum level of operational
automaticity. Automaticity is explained in terms of both general
experience and maturational factors.
Not only is there no increase in the size of the CPC after two years, but
also no change in the child's capacity for learning across the stages of
development. All that changes are the types of learning. Case (1978)
says that this conclusion follows from two assumptions:
i) that learning occurs very rapidly when the elements to be learned
can be placed in the working memory simultaneously.
ii) that the capability for learning certain content varies radically as
a function of the strategies that are available and the size of the
functional storage space in the domain in question.
From the age of two years the child has the capacity for complex learning
in terms of II rawll energy, but that at this early age the distribution of
. this energy (with a large amount being used for operations and therefore a
small amount for storage) limits the complexity of his/her mental
operations. Thus all that changes with time is the gradual redistribution
of this energy rather than its quantity.
Case argues that many tasks a child encounters in his/her day-to-day
existence are familiar (repeatedly exposed to the child) and facilitating
(have no features that suggest an incorrect strategy). In such a task the
child need not bring a complex knowledge gathering strategy to the
situation. Its only requirement is that the child has sufficient function
storage space 10 attend to two task elements at the same time (the one
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presumably being the recently-automatised executive control structure of
the immediately preceding stage, and the . other the about-to-be-
incorporated new loop) as well as sufficient motivation to persist until
these elements form one chunk.
Casels version of Pascual-Leone's thought is simplified to the extent that
it is unable to deal with the complexity of cognitive development. At
best it is a description of one very particular form of learning -
Pascual-Leone's .hf.learning. Ironically, he simplifies Pascual-Leone's
thought to such an extent that he falls into the very trap that Pascual-
Leone developed his theory to overcome , and the most central issue for a
t>(
theory of cognitive development - the learning paradox.
Casels theory does not tackle the issue of the learning paradox. He
briefly mentions it once in his 1980 paper, saying the notion of the CPC
is necessary because task related experience is inadequate to explain the -
infant's success in "qenui ne ly novel problems" (p. 11). However in the
remainder of the paper he fails to provide any indication of the relevance
of the CPC to this problem. In his 1978 paper he expressly dismisses the
need to consider unfamiliar tasks, saying that this was only necessary for
Piaget because he was considering lit he structure of the childls knowledge-
gathering act ivf ty'' rather than "childrens' knowledge per se (p. 61).
(The implication here is that Case is concerned with the latter - a
betrayal of his avowed intent to produce a "functional" theory, "to
describe the mechanisms whereby knowledge is acquired and utilised"
(1974, p. 542).)
Not only does he fail to tackle the issue of the learning paradox directly
but he fails to make any sort of conVincing case for the existence of
factors other th~n learning in cognitive development, and his theory thus
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precludes its solution. One important reason for this failure is his
exclusive focus on familiar and facilitating tasks, and his definition of
his developmental stages and sub-stages in terms of the child's ability to
perform such tasks.
His account of the acquisition of knowledge akin to Pascual-Leone's .hI
learning is limited: the child learns by repeatedly chunking his/her
newly-acquired automatised basic operation with a new loop, the two
requirements for thIs being:
i) sufficient repeated exposure to the task, and
ii) sufficient motivation to persist in holding the elements in working
memory for long enough to enable them to become chunked.
(One way he might have introduced a situation-free factor into this
learning process could have been to link maturation and motivation).
He sees development in terms of progress up a hierarchy of tasks, each
task composed of a rigidly fossilised lower order task plus one extra
mental operation. This view severely limits the child's potential for
novelty seen as a new combination of elements, since the most Case's
developing child can do is to add one more loop to a rigid pre-existing
scheme.
Although Case claims that the growth of the working memory/CPC is
determined by organismic factors, he explains this process totally in
terms of learning.
i) He insists that the size of the working memory remains unchanged
after two years of age, and that all that changes is the ratio of
energy devoted to 0 (operations) and s (storage).
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ii) Then he explains this changing ratio in terms of operational
automaticity which frees energy previously required by operations to
be used for storage.
iii) Then he exp lains operational automaticity in terms of repeated
practice/exposure to the particular learned task in question. Thus ·
while paying lip-service to the notion of a maturationally
developing CPC, he fails to explain what this maturationalelement
could be and how it would interact with learning in cognitive
development.
This involves the following circular argument:
1. Case holds that cognitive development cannot be explained in terms
of learning alone, and introduces an organismic factor, the CPC.
2. The CPC does not change in size. Its growth is explained in terms
of a shifting ratio of energy/space allocation.
3. This shifting ratio is explained in terms of increasing operational
automaticity of basic operations.
4. This operational automaticity is explained in terms of
practice/repeated exposure to the task in question ie learning.
To avoid this predicament he should:
a) not have argued that the CPC remained a constant size after 2 years
of age (point 2), or else
b) explained operational automaticity in organismic terms.
Because Case fails to make an adequate case for the existence of factors
other than learning, his theory is of no use for the purpose of the
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present research. Applied in this context, Case's theory would commit him
to the cultural relativist position, explaining cognitive development in
terms of learning, and falling prey to the criticism of cultural
relativism discussed earlier, namely its inability to deal with truly
novel performance or change. Case has simply turned Pascual-Leone's
theory into yet another learning theory.
Success of the present research in its objective to show that there are
developmental restrictions on the rate of growth of ~ or CPC (and that
even . with overlearning a child can only reach certain levels of
performance at two-yearly intervals) will discredit Casels hypothesis that
CPC has a constant amount of energy. One could no longer explain the
developmental stages in terms of the reallocation of this energy as a
result of learning.
"If Mstages of two-year duration can be demonstrated
empirically, there is no possibility of explaining
effective ~ growth in terms of executive changes
(learning), for there is no possible and plausible
learning explanation that can predict an absence of







4. 1 THE FIGURAL INTERSECTIONS TEST
The FIT (Pascual-Leone no date; Johnson, 1982; Goodman, 1979) is a group
administered paper and pencil test designed by Pascual-Leone to measure M-
power. M-measurement tasks are constructed by the double procedure of
theory-guided metasubjective task analysis and quantitative structural
analysis. The former procedure assigns ~-demands to tasks (the ~-demand
being the minimum number of schemes which must be simultaneously ~-boosted
in order to solve a task). Quantitative structural analysis is used to
select task items that be~t reflect M-variance. This involves the study
of the developmental patterns of performance on a task and the patterns of
correlations of the task with other already-established ~-measures.
Using these methods a test is constructed with a variety of items
representativ~ of the range of ~-power of interest. Because a subject
should not be able to pass a task before his/her ~-power is equal to the
task1s M-demand, the passing rates of subjects on the graded ~ items
provide estimates of their ~-power. A pure ~ task should attempt to
minimise the role of silent operators (eg l or I) other than M, so that
their influence does not confound the ~-measure yielded by the test.
Description of the FIT
The task consists of a booklet of items in which each item consists of two
sets of figures, one "presentation set" on the right side of a page, and
one "intersecting set" on the left. In the presentation set a number of
single geometric figures are arranged separately. In the intersecting set
the same figures are presented in an overlapping way such that there is
one area of common intersection. The subject1s task is to find this area
of intersection and mark it with a dot. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate
sample FIT items.
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Items vary with regard to the number of shapes in the presentation and
test sets. In some items there is also a misleading irrelevant shape in
the test set, which is not present in the presentation set and which does
not form a common area of intersection with all the other shapes. Figure
2 illustrates an item with an irrelevant shape. It is a matter of
controversy as to whether or not an irrelevant shape adds to an item's M-
demand (Johnson, 1982). As a result there are two ways of scoring the
test (see next section). In the RAC794 version of the FIT used in this
research, the class of a FIT item without an irrelevant shape is
designated by the number of shapes in the presentation set. The class of
an item with an irrelevant shape is designated by the number of shapes in
the presentation set "+1 11 • Thus Figure 4.1 depicts a class 4 item, and
Figure 4.2 a class 4+1 item.
The FIT RAC794 includes 36 items distributed in the following classes:
Class 2 5 items
Class 3 4 items
Class 3+1 item
Class 4 4 items
Class 4+1 2 items
Class 5 4 items
Class 5+1 item
Class 6 4 items
Class 6+1 item
Class 7 4 items
Class 7+1 item




FIT RAC 794 : CLASS 4 ITEM
FIGURE 4.2
FIT RAC 794 : CLASS 4+1 ITEM
o
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Items are randomly ordered with respect to class (Appendix A includes
examples of each item class).
Administration of the FIT
Each child is given a FIT booklet and a red pen. In an elaborate
instruction period, using class 2 items, subjects are familiarised with
features of the task.
a) The subjects are told that the items are arranged in paired . s~ts.
They should first attend to the separate figures on the right, marking
each with a dot before attending to the intersecting shapes on the
left. This ensures that the subject has attended to each individual
figure.
b) The subjects are shown the correspondence between the items in the
intersecting set and the presentation set. It is stressed that this
correspondence need only be one of shape, and that the size and
orientation of items can vary from the presentation to the
intersecting set.
c) The subjects are told about the possibility of encountering irrelevant
figures in the intersecting set which are not found . in the
presentation set. These figures should be disregarded.
d) Subjects are familiarised with the notion of the intersection of all
the relevant figures, to be marked by placing a dot in the area of
intersection.
Detailed instructions are presented in Pascual-Leone's FIT Manual (no
date).
The children are warned that they cannot rub out marks made by the red
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pen. Therefore they must think very carefully since more than one dot on
the left will be counted as wrong~
The tester circulates among the children, watching for certain errors
which should be prevented. No more information is given about how to
solve the task, but children who are struggling may be encouraged by
repeating the instructions again.
Common errors which must be guarded against are:
1) Marks on the set of shapes other than the necessary dots. Some
subjects lightly place their pen inside each shape as they find it,
leaving faint marks. Some subjects try and correct errors, and place
two or more dots on the intersecting figure. Some forget the
instructions and put a dot in every shape on the left.
2) Dots on the line, or large dots -that cover more than one area.
3) Missed items. Subjects should try every item, even if they have to
guess.
The test is untimed. SUbjects usually finished it within 30 minutes.
Initially the teaching of instructions took 20 - 30 minutes, but on the
third and fourth attempts this period diminished as children became
familiar with what had to be done.
Scoring
A FIT item is passed if there is a mark in the area of common intersection
in the test set which does not also extend into another area, and there
are no otner marks on the test set. The reason for this last requirement
is that the tendency of some subjects to mark each shape in the
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intersecting set as they identify it, reduces the M-demand of the test.
The M-demand is given precisely by the need to mentally keep track of all
'~
the figures which are located in the intersecting pattern.
Parkinson (1975) found that estimates of ~-power could be generated from
the FIT by determining ~ as the highest FIT class in which a subject could
pass at least 75% of the class items. She found that the central tendency
of the frequency distribution of k estimates tended to match the
theoretically predicted ~~power values, although the range of variation
was considerable, and the distributions tended to be skewed towards k
values higher than those theoretically predicted.
Previous research has shown that the FIT on average yields k-scores
consi~tent with the TeO's age-determined values.
11However the range of k estimates tends to be too
large, presumably because, as the test stands, FIT
performance reflects individual differences in
strategies, susceptibility to field effects, chance
performance, .and other factors as well as the
individual's ~ value." (Pascual-Leone, no date, p, 9).
In view of the controversy as to whether the presence of an irrelevant
non-intersecting figure increases the ~-demand of an item, two methods of
scoring the FIT were applied in the present research. The first method,
called X-scaling, assumes that the presence of an irrelevant figure does
not increase the ~-demand of a task, and thus includes items of the x+1
variety in class x when scoring. Thus in Figure 4.2, for example, an item
of the 4+1 variety, would be included in class 4. The second method,
called V-scaling, includes items of the x+1 variety in the class higher
than x. Thus Figure 4.2 would be included in class 5 for scoring
purposes.
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In the present research the difference between X-scaling and V-scaling was
negligible, with the X-scores tending to be slightly lower than the Y-
scores. In other words X-scaling proved to be a very slightly stricter
measure. This study chose to use X-scaling, the more conservative
measure. Thus the X~scores are written up in the results sections (Table
5.2 and Figures 5.1 to 5.7). The V-scores are included in Appendix B.
4.2 SUBJECTS
SUbjects were working-class Zulu-speaking schoolchildren drawn from the
Dukemini Primary School. E Section, Kwa Mashu. Kwa Mashu is a sprawling
urban township on the outskirts of Durban, inhabited predominantly by
Zulu-speaking people who work in Durban and the surrounding areas.
The sample was drawn from children who had performed to criterion on the
pre-test of the Compound Stimulus Visual Information task (CSVI), another
M-test, derived by Pascual-Leone. The reason for this choice of subjects
was that this study is part of a larger research project which will
eventually, amongst other things, compare sUbjects· performance across the
CSVI and the FIT.
Altogether 252 children tested were in the age groups 7 - 8, 9 - 10 and




















The rese~rch aimed to investigate children in the 7- 8, 9 - 10, 11 - 12
age groups because each group comprises a Teo sub-stage. The number of
children in each sUb-stage is shown in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4










From the above distributions it will be clear that the 7 - 8 year aIds
consisted of a higher proportion of 8 year aIds that 71s, the 9 - 10 year
aIds of a higher proportion of 91s than 10·s and the 11 - 12 year aIds of
a higher proportion of 11's than 12 1s. This was due to delays in testing
as a result of disruption in the schools. This meant that the FIT tests
were conducted four months after the CSVI tests, with the result that many
of the subjects then fell into a different age group.
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4.3 PROCEDURE
The research planned to test the children four times at weekly intervals.
However due to school unrest there was a two-week interval between the
third and the fourth trials. They were tested in groups of 20. For each
new trial the intersecting set of shapes was rotated 45 degrees. This was
to ensure that children did not become familiar with the test items. The





Two performance criteria were considered in approaching the analysis of
results. The first was the criterion established by Pascual-Leone and
Burtis (1975) (used by Goodman (1979) in her analysis of FIT data). This
specifies that the highest item class succeeded at a probability level of
0.75 by subjects of !i-power ~ + ~ is cles s k. For example the highest
class passed by the majority of 7-year-olds (!i =~ + 3) is class 3, by 9
year olds (~= ~ + 4) is class 4, and by11 year olds (!i = ~ +5) is class
5. This criterion (which will be referred to as the Pascual-Leone and
Burtis criterion) specifies further that performance drops off from 0.75
to 0.60 or less in classes with an M-demand one or more k units higher
than the particular subject's age-determined !i-level.
The second criterion against which performance in the present research
will be considered is the set of results found by Goodman (1979) who
tested c~ildren in the 7 - 12 age range on the FIT. According to Goodman,
these results 11 ... show basically the structure ... empirically found by
Pascual-Leone and Burtis (1975)11, (Goodman, 1979, p. 281) and she presents
these data as the passing probabilities for each age at each stimulus
class. These results are presented in Table 5.1.
TABLE 5.1
Goodman 's (1979) Data on the Percentage of Correct FIT Responses as a
Function of Age and Stimulus Class
STIMULUS CLASS
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
7 - 8 95 88 50 43 27 8 10
AGE 9 - 10 98 92 76 57 42 15 15
11 - 12 100 98 90 71 51 27 20
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Looking at Table 5.1 in terms of the Pascual-Leone and Burtis criterion,
the 7 - 8 year olds are well above the 75 percent passing level on class
3, and well below the 60 percent level on all higher classes. The 9 - 10
year aIds pass class 4 at the 75 percent level, and drop below 60 percent
on the subsequent classes. Although the 11 - 12 year aIds pass class 5 at
71 percent, below Pascual-Leone and Burtis ' specification of 75 percent,
Goodman points out that even this level serves to dist inguish th is age
group from the others, and points to class 5 as the highest class before
which performance drops to 60%or below.
The Goodman (1979) data will be used as an approximate guide to criterion
performance by middle-class schoolchildren from a westernised-
industrialised-technological schooled society.
Two issues are at stake in analysing the present results. The first . is
the prediction that the first time the children do the test they will not
all perform to criterion. However, once they have been prOVided with the
experience necessary to acquire the relevant executives, they will perform r
to criterion. The second issue is that there is a developmental "ceiling"
on a child's ~-power at each stage, and that in spite of over-learning
children will not be able to perform beyond their ~-power. In statistical ~
form these issues may be translated into the following predictions:
a) On Trial 1 the children will not perform to criterion~ This means
that less than 75% of the responses of the 7 - 8, 9 - 10 and 11 - 12
year aIds will be correct on item classes 3, 4 and 5 respectively.
These scores · wi 11 be lower than those of the Goodman
data.
b) On successive trials performance will reach criterion. This means
that perhaps as early as Trial 2, but definitely by Trials 3 and 4,
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75% of the subjects I responses will be correct on their age-
appropriate item class.
c) Once the children have reached their age-appropriate criterion there
will be no significant improvement on successive trials. This means
that there will -be an age-determined "ceiling" to their performance.
For analyses, the responses of each test were grouped according to their
item class. Then the sums of correct responses for each item class were
calculated, yielding seven scores per test. (All items classes except
class 4 consisted of 5 response items and thus the highest possible score
for these items was 5. There were 6 response items belonging to class 4,
and thus the highest possible score for this class was' 6). The item class
means were then calculated for each age group on each trial. The means
and standard deviations are presented in Table 5.2. The data are also
presented graphically in Figures 5.1 to 5.7. (The results presented in
this section are those derived from the X-scaling scoring method ; with the
V-scaling included in Appendix B).
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TABLE 5.2
Means and Standard Deviations for the Three Age Groups on Each Trial for
The Seven Item Classes
(Means above, Standard deviations below)
Item Class 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
A1 T1 4.507 3.746 3.851 2.358 1.269 0.463 0.254
0.959 1.259 1.777 1.367 1. 175 0.826 0.472
A1 T2 4.761 4.269 3.507 3.149 2.000 1. 119 0.373
0.605 1.250 1.330 1.559 1.255 1.023 0.573
A1 13 4.925 4.537 4.731 3.836 2.672 1.687 0.821
0.317 0.983 1.388 1.238 1.655 1.062 0.903
A1 T4 4.970 4.731 4.477 3.567 2.493 1.582 . 0.612
0.602 0.592 1.521 1. 131 1.284 1. 143 0.673
A2 T1 4.579 3.965 3.359 2.561 1.693 0.675 0.228
1.136 1.499 1.887 1.494 1.440 0.936 0.498
A2 T2 4.868 4.465 3.859 3.588 2.281 1.430 0.675
0.388 0.942 1.296 1.368 1.340 1. 152 0.991
A2 13 4.930 4.658 5.070 4.088 2.772 1.904 0.912
0.289 0.702 1. 195 1. 125 1.396 1. 136 1. 130
A2 T4 4.982 4.789 5.122 4. 105 2.974 1.833 0.983
0.132 0.556 1.183 1.285 1.333 1.004 0.922
A3 T1 4.789 4.493 3.648 3.324 1.901 0.873 0.380
0.411 0.924 1.733 1.350 1.333 1.027 0.763
A3 T2 4.944 4.620 4.183 3.859 2.535 1.549 0.831
0.232 0.663 1.073 1. 112 1.510 1. 169 0.894
A3 13 4.972 4.8592 5.352 4.296 3.225 2.014 1.042
0.167 0.389 1.016 1.020 1.375 1. 189 0.917
A3 T4 5.000 4.8028 5.282 4.324 3. 105 2.014 1. 141
0.521 0.401 0.988 1.039 1.211 1. 102 1. 138
A1 7 - 8 years T1 Trial
A2 9 - 10 years T2 Trial 2
A2 11 - 12 years 13 Trial 3
T4 Trial 4
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Figures 5.1 to 5.3 present the item class means, expressed as percentages,
for the 7 - 8, 9 - 10 and 11 - 12 age groups respectively over each of the
four trials. In Figures 5.4 to 5.7 the same data are represented for each
trial across the different age groups.
The data were analysed further by a 3 x 4 (age x trials) analysis of
variance with repeated measures (trials). Table 5.3 represents the annova
summary table for item classes 2 to 8. With the exception of class 3,
there was no significant interaction between the age (A) and trials .( 8)
variables, but the main effects were significant at the 0.01 level for all
item classes. For item class 3 there was a significant interaction
between the age and trials variables (p < 0.01).
These effects were analysed further by means of the Tukey's HSD statistic
to establish which levels of each respective variable were significantly
different from each other. The results of the Tukey's tests are
summarised in Tables 5.4.1, 5.4.2 and 5.4.3.
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TABLE 5.3-- - - -
Summary of Analyses of Variance for Item Classes 2 t o 8
Item Class Source SS OF MS F-rat io
2 A 27.765 2 8.883 6.390 **
S/A 346. 118 249 1.390
B 64.789 3 21.596 40.383 **
A x B 5.549 6 0.925 1.729
B x S/A 399. 486 r 747 0.535
3 A 22.372 2 11.186 7. 122 **
S/A 391.072 249 1.571
B 71.078 3 23.693 39. 353 **
A x B 20.373 6 1.729 2.872 **
B x S/A 449.734 747 0.602
4 A 85.415 2 42.708 9.703 **
A/A 1095. 933 24 9 4.401
B 531.355 3 177 .118 155.234 **
A x B 2.732 6 0.455 0.399
B x S/A 852.310 747 1. 141
5 A 83.037 2 41.519 11 .634 **
S/A 888.590 249 3.569
B 265 . 14 1 3 88.380 89.580 **
A x B 11.020 6 1.837 1.863
B x S/A 736.994 747 . 0.987
6 A 55.886 2 27.943 7.284 **
S/A 955.176 249 3.836
8 257.808 3 85. 936 70.797 **
A x B 3.823 6 0.637 0.525
B x S/A 906. 731 747 1.214
7 A 25.892 2 12 .946 5.550 **
S/A 580. 811 249 2.332
B 218.472 3 72.824 97.891 **
A x B 0. 505 6 0.084 0.113
B x S!A 555 .7P 747 0.744
8 A 17. 765 2 8.883 6.390 **
5!A 346.1 18 249 1.390
B 64 .790 3 21.597 40.383 **
A x B 5.550 6 . 0.925 1.729






Results of Tukey's Tests Invest igating Differences in Mean Performance
on Trials 1 to 4 for Each Age Group
ITEM CLASS 3 ITEM CLASS 4
Trials 2 3 4 2 3 4
1 s ** s ** s ** 1 s ** s ** s **
7 - 8 years 2 ns s ** 2 s ** **
3 ns 3 s **
4 4
1 s *.;. S ** s ** 1 s ** s ** s **
9 - 10 years 2 ns s * 2 s ** s **
3 ns 3 ns
4 4
1 ns s * ns 1 s ** s ** s **
11 - 12 years 2 ns ns 2 s ** s **
3 ns 3 ns
4 4
ITEMCLASS 5 ITEMCLASS 6
Trials 2 3 4 2 3 4
1 s ** s ** s ** 1 s ** s ** s **
7 - 8 years 2 s ** s ** 2 s ** **
3 s * 3 ns
4 4
1 ** ** S ** 1 s ** s ** s **
9 - 10 years 2 s ** s ** 2 s ** s **
3 ns 3 ns
4 4
1 s ** s ** s ** 1 s ** s ** 5 **
11 - 12 years 2 s ** s ** 2 s ** s **
3 ns 3 ns
4 4
s = si gnifi cant ** p 0.01
ns non-signif icant * p 0.05
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'TA8LE 5.4.2
Results of Tukey ' s Tests Invest igat ing Age-Group
Differences in Performance for Each Tr ial
ITEM CLASS 3 ITEM CLASS 4
7 - 8 9 - 10 11 - 12 7 - 8 9 - 10 11 - 12
7 - 8 ns s ** 7 - 8 s ** s **
TRIAL 1 9 - 10 s ** 9 - 10 ns
11 - 12 11 - 12
7 - 8 ns s * 7 - 8 ns s **
TRIAL 2 9 - 10 ns 9 - 10 ns
11 - 12 11 - 12
7 - 8 ns ns 7 - 8 ns s **
TRIAL 3 9 - 10 · ns 9 - 10 ns
11 - 12 11 - 12
7 - 8 ns ns 7 - 8 ns s **
TRIAL 3 9 - 10 ns 9 - 10 ns
11 - 12 11 - 12
7 - 8 ns ns 7 - 8 s ** s **
TRIAL 4 9 - 10 ns 9 - 10 ns
11 - 12 11 - 12
ITEMCLASS 5 ITEM CLASS 6
7 - 8 9 - 10 11 - 12 7 - 8 9 - 10 11 - 12
7 - 8 ns ** 7 - 8 s ** s **
TRIAL 1 9 - 10 s ** 9 - 10 ns
11 - 12 11 - 12
i . 8 s ** s ** 7 - 8 ns s **
TRIAL 2 9 - 10 ns 9 - 10 ns---
11 - 12 11 - 12
7 - 8 ns s ** 7 - 8 ns s *
TRI AL 3 9 - 10 ns 9 - 10 ns
11 - 12 11 - 12
7 - 8 s ** s ** 7 - 8 s ** s **
TRIAL 4 9 - 10 ns 9 - 10 ns
11 - 12 11 - 12
s s ignificant ** p 0. 01
ns non-significant * p 0.05
5.4 .3.1
TABLE 5.4.3
Results of Tukey's Tests Investigating Differences in Age-Group
Performance Meaned Across t he Four Trials
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s * s **
ns ~ **
ns s **ITEM 7 - 8
CLASS 9 - 10
3 11 - 12
ITEM 7 - 8
CLASS 9 - 10
4 11 - 12
ITEM 7 - 8
CLASS 9 - 10
5 11 - 12
ItEM 7 - 8
CLASS 9 - 10
6 11 - 12








5.4.3 .2 Res ult s of Tukey's Test s Invest igati ng Dif ferences in Performance
on Each Trial Meaned Across the Three Age Groups
2 3 4
ITEM 1 s ** s ** s **
CL ASS 2 ns s **
3 3 ns
4
ITEM 1 s ** s ** **
CLASS 2 s ** s **
4 3 ns
4
ITEM 1 ** s ** s **
CLASS 2 s ** s **
5 3 ns
4
ITEM 1 ** s ** s **
CL ASS 2 s ** s **
6 3 ns
4
s signif icant ** p 0.01
ns non-signif icant * D 0.05
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In Figures 5.1 to 5.3 the data are presented separately for each age
group. In each of the figures the results for each of the four trials are
plotted across the item classes. In addition, the results obtained by
Goodman are plotted and provide a sense of comparison. On each figure the
75% and 60%criterion levels are indicated as well as the age-appropriate
item class.
7 -8 year olds (Figure 5.1)
Figure 5.1 shows that for item class 3 (the TeO's criterion level for this
age group) the 7 - 8 year olds succeeded on 74%of the item responses.
Although this is near the Pascual-Leone and Burtis 75% criterion level, it
is well below Goodman's passing probability of 88 percent for 7 - 8 1s on
this class. This age group also perform below 88 percent on Trial 2,
reaching this level on Trial 3.
Table 5.4.1 shows that on item class 3 performance improved significantly
from Trial 1 to Trial 2 (p < 0.01). Thereafter there . was a gradual
increase in success, with no significant improvement from Trials 2 to 3,
and 3 to 4. However there was a significant improvement from Trial 2 to
Trial 4 (p < 0.01).
On class 4 items these children performed below the 60% level on Trial 1,
as predicted by thePascual-Leone and Burtis criterion (although their
performance did not differ from Goodman1s 7 - 8 passing probability of 50
percent). Similarly on class 5 items on Trial 1 they performed below the
60% level (although performance reached Goodman1s passing probability of
43 percent). However on subsequent trials in both class 4 and 5 items the
7 - 81s performed above the 60 percent level, and surpassed Goodman1s
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on these items - thus reaching the level expected of 11 - 12 year olds.
On Trial 4 their performance level dropped slightly but did not differ
significantly from their Trial 3 performance (see Table 5.4.1).
On item class 6 and 7thechildren performed at the same level as the
Goodman data on Trial 1, and surpassed it on the succeeding trials.
Table 5.4.3.2 shows that on all four item classes under consideration,
performance seemed . to reach a "cei l inq" on Trial 3, with no significant
improvement on Trial 4.
9 - 10 year olds (Figure 5.2)
For item class 4 (the age-appropriate item class for this age group) the 9
- 10's performed well below the 75 percent level and below the level of
the Goodman subjects on Trial 1. By Trial 2 their performance had
improved significantly (p < 0.01), reaching both these levels. Their
performance continued 't o improve significantly on Trial 3 (p < 0.01),
where it stabilised, with no significant improvement on Trial 4, (see
Table 5.4.1).
On item class 5 the 9 - 10's under-performed on Trial 1, with performance
well below that of the Goodman subjects. However their performance
improved dramatically on Trials 2, 3 and 4, amply surpassing the Goodman
data. On Trials 3 and 4 their performance exceeded the 75 percent mark _
reaching the level expected of 11 - 12 year olds. Performance once again
reached a "ceiling" on Trial 3 (see Table 5.4.1).
On item class 6 performance was below the 60% level as predicted by the
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Goodman's criterion on Trial 1 but surpassed it by a wide margin on the
following trials. Once again performance reached a "cei Iinq" on Trial 3
(see Table 5.4.1).
11 -12 year olds (Figure 5.3)
On item class 4, the 11 - 12's succeeded on only 60 percent of the items,
falling well below the Pascual-Leone and Burtis criterion of 75% for this
class, and also well below the Goodman subjects. However their
performance increased significantly on the three following trials (see
Table 5.4.1).
Similarly on item class 5 they under-performed on Trial 1, but
over-performed on Trials 2, 3 and 4.
On item class 6 performance fell on or below the 60 percent level on all
four trials, as predicted by the Pascual-Leone and Burtis criterion. With
regard to the Goodman criterion the children under-performed on Trial 1,
reached criterion on Trial 2, and over-performed on Trials 3 and 4.
On each of the item classes 4, 5 and 6, performance improved significantly
(p < 0.01) from Trials 1 to 2 and 2 to 3, but reached a "cei l i nq" on Trial
3 with no significant improvement from Trials 3 to 4.
Trials 2 to 4 (Figures 5.4 to 5.7 respectively)
Figures 5.4 to 5.7 present the same data as Figures 5.1 to 5.3, but this
time laid out separately for each trial : Several interesting features of
these graphs must be noted.
. Figure 5.4 shows that the 7 - 8 1s almost reach criterion on Trial 1.
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However the 9 - 10 ls under-perform, reaching only the 7 - 8 level as
defined by the Pascual-Leone and Burtis criterion. The 11 - 12's are not
much better. Apart from surpassing the 60 percent mark by a narrow margin
on class 5 items, they also perform at the 7 - 8 criterion level.
Figure 5.5 shows that by Trial 2, all three age groups have reached their
age-appropriate level according to the Pascual-Leone and Burtis criterion.
On Trial 3 (Figure. 5.6) although the 11 - 12's performance improves,. it
does not exceed the Pascual-Leone and Burtis criterion for this age group
(apart from a minor over-performance on Class 6 items). However the 9 -
10 ls performance has reached the 11 - 12 criterion level, as has the 7 - 8
performance.
As has already been noted, there is no significant difference in
performance on Trials 3 and 4. (Although there is a non-significant drop
in the performance of the 7 - 8 1s on the higher item classes).
Thus the interesting fact emerges that on Trial 1 all the subjects perform
more or less at the 7 - 8 level (apart from the 7 - 8's themselves who are
only very slightly below). On Trial 3 the "cel Ii nq'' trial, beyond which
there is no significant change, all the subjects perform at the 11 - 12
level (apart from the 11 - 12 1s who are slightly above on class 6 items).
In summary, overall trends in the data support the three predictive
hypotheses laid out earlier in this section. The children underperformed
on Trial 1 and reached criterion on Trial 2. Their performance improved
from Trials 2 to 3 - and then reached a II cei l i ngll, with no significant
improvement from Trials 3 to 4. However while the general pattern of
development In the present study supported the hypotheses, the k-scores at
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which the 7 - 8 and 9 - 10 subjects reached their "ceiling" of performance
were higher than those laid down by the TCOls theoretical predictions.
Using the Pascual-Leone and Burtis criterion for the f (f being the item
class at which subjects of each particular f-related age group succeed at
75 percent, with less than 60 percent success at all higher item classes),
by Trials 3 and 4, the 7 - 8 year olds were performing at a level of f =
-
5, that is two k-units higher than their age-appropriate level (k = 3).
On these trials th~ 9 - 10 year olds also performed at f = 5, one unit
above their age-appropriate level (f = 4). On the other hand, the 11 - 12
age group's performance conformed to the TCOls predictions. They
performed at the k = 5 level on Trial 2, and did not exceed it on the two





6.1 The first section of this discussion suggests an explanation for two
features of the data which do not appear to conform to certain of the
TCO's theoretical predictions. The first of these features is the lack of
evidence for stage-wise improvement from one age-group to the next. The
second is the fact that the 7 - 8's and 9 - 10 ls exceeded criterion, while
the 11 - 12's did not. This explanation requires (i) a detailed task
analysis of the FIT itself, as well as (ii) an examination of the
resources available to the individual to succeed on the test. This
involves attention. to the interaction between age-related developmental
(context-free) resources and learning (context-specific) resources.
According to the TCOls "metasubjective task analysis" the M-demand for a
task is the number of schemes that need to be mentally activated in order \ .
to execute the most demanding step in a task. One scheme needs to be
activated continually throughout a task sequence. This is the executive
scheme and represents the overall plan of action. This is the scheme
labelled e in the equation ~ = ~ +~, and it is simply taken to be a
constant amount of energy from stage to stage, counted separately from
the other schemes in calculating ~-demand.
The other schemes involved at any step in task execution - those involved
in the calculation of k-scores- are one or more figurative " schemes
"representing past or present states of affairs", and an operative scheme
representing a transformation or operation (Scardamalia, 1977, p. 33).
Before proceeding to a detailed task analysis of the FIT, attention must
be given to the review of a large body of FIT data by Pascual-Leone and
Burtis (1975) who found that the datals structure corresponded closely to
an "equally-spaced additive conjoint structure" (Johnson, 1982, p. 17).
In the cas~ of the FIT this means the following in terms of the
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relationship between ~-power and item class (Goodman, 1979; Pascual-Leone,
1976):
1. For any age, a given probability of solving items of class x implies
at least as high a probability of solving items of classes lower than
x.
2. Older subjects succeed (at a given probability level) at higher
classes than younger subjects.
3. The relation between age and item class is such that an increase · of
one unit of ~-power (as estimated by age) is matched by success on
items one class larger.
4. The highest item class passed ata probability level of . 0.75 by
subjects with an ~-power of ~ + ~ is class ~ (for example the highest
class solved by the majority of 7 - 8 year olds (~= ~ + 3) is class
3).
The following task analysis of the FIT test suggested by Goodman (1979)
supports this outline of the relationship between ~-power and item class :
Successful performance on a FIT item requires the subject to identify in
. the intersecting set each of the separately presented figures in the
presentation set. (In the intersecting set simple perceptual matching is
not adequate for finding the relevant shapes, since the shapes in the
intersecting set may differ in size and orientation from those presented
separately). The identification of each shape involves a figurative
scheme. At each step of this identification strategy, the shapes found so
far must be kept in mind as each new shape is matched, and finally the
whole set of shapes must be processed together by an operative scheme that
picks out. the area of common intersection. In this process the first
figure identified plays a special role. Subjects most often peg the
101
first-identified figure as a boundary or "ground" within which the
remaining shapes are inspected (Goodman, 1979). This is often overtly
done by placing a finger or the pen on one figure in the intersection set
to "narrow down " the area in which the intersection must fall. According
to Goodman (1979) this analysis suggests that for any class x, with one
figure acting as ground, x - 1 figures must be identified involving x - 1
figurative schemes. These schemes must be conjointly processed together
with the one operat ive scheme representing the act of identifying the area
of common intersect ion. This yields an ~-demand equal to the number .of
shapes in the intersecting set, which is the class value for each item
((x - 1) + 1 = x number of schemes).
The data support this task analysis on Trial 2, where the children
performed as predicted. However the task analysis does not explain the
improvement on Trial 3 insofar as it implies that the 7 - 8 1s should reach
their developmental ceiling at ~ = 3, the 9 - 10 ls at ~ = 4 and the 11 -
12's at k = 5. As was noted in the results section, all these age groups
reached their ceiling at k = 5.
This section seeks to explain this aspect of the data in terms of :
i) The effect of non-M factors on FIT performance, especially fand 1.
ii) The composition of the present research sample.
The next sub-section looks at the non-~ factors that affect performance on
the FIT , to show that ~ is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for
good performance, and that non-~ factors (for example those related to L
and F) can lead a subject to the same performance as would a higher M-
power. This i~formation will be linked to particular characteristics of
the present study's sample, to show that these unexpected k levels can be
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explained within the parameters of the TCO.
6.1.1 Effect of Non-M Factors on FIT Performance
Before discussing the effect of non ~ factors on FIT performance, it must
be stressed that the FIT was designed to be administered once, and not
three or four times ~ Thus with practice it becomes an overlearned task.
Thus the children's dramatic over-performance relative to the Goodman
(1979) data on the later trials may be partly ascribed to the effect of
practice, resulting in the development of strong, task-appropriate
context-specific operators which reduce the taskls ~-demand. In addi t ion
Pascual-Leone and Goodman (1979) assert that in overlearned tasks there .
may be a decrease in executive demand.
UIn an overlearned task the executive may need less M-
boosting, thus leaving more M-energy free for use with
other schemes, and consequently, increasing the
measure of l (p. 324).
We can now turn to Goodmanls (1979) comments on the effect of non-M
factors on the FIT. Performance on the FIT does not always strictly
conform to the TCOls theoretical predictions concerning ~ because
according to the TCa certain factors other than . ~ may intervene in
performance (Goodman, 1979; Johnson, 1982; Pascual-Leone no date; Pascual-
Leone, 1976). Goodman (1979) outlines three such factors: F and LC
factors, executive strategy factors and "operat ive mobility effects" (p.
269). These are considered in turn:
6.1.1.1 FandLCfactors
To the extent that the intersecting set presents gestalt-like qualities
where the. pattern of the set is compelling as a whole, some items may
present an f-misleading structure which impedes sUbjects in defining the
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outlines of particular shapes. The pattern-like qualities of the
int ersect ion set may match the ~ pattern-structures of the subjects such
that the LC~boosted pattern of the figure as a whole conflicts with the
task requirement that the subject separately identify the outline of each
figure, because the outline of each figure has become embedded or
submerged in the whole.
Skakich (1978) notes that this embedding problem may be especially strong
in items that contain a triangle and at least one other shape with
straight lines. She interviewed subjects as to the strategies they were
using to solve FIT items, and found that on items with triangles, subjects
"tended to confuse primary contour areas (for example the triangle as
drawn) with secondary contour areas (such as new triangles or triangle-
like shapes fortuitously .created by the intersection)" (Skakich, 1978, p.
109).
From her interviews, Skakich (1978) identified three Le and f-fac ilitating
factors which may serve as potential confounding factors in the FIT's
measurement of M. The first of these is the tendency to perceptually
identify the area of greatest visual density (the area of the intersecting
set with the most lines around it) as the intersection area. This
tendency is potentially facilitating particularly with some of the higher
class items. Size is another perceptual cue. Subjects tend to identify
the smallest area in the intersection set, also providing an easy solution
to some of the higher class items. The third perceptual cue is centrality
items whose solution falls in the centre of the test set may be more
easily solved than others of their class.
Thus on some items the influence of F and LC facilitating effects may
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enable subjects with suitable executives, F and Le factors to solve items ·
whose M-demand exceeds their ~-power. It is important to note that
effects that may be facilitating in one context may serve to be misleading
in another.
6. 1.1.2 Operati ve mobil i ty factors
Subjects that are able to vary their approaches to the FIT items are most
likely to succeed, and least likely to be overwhelmed by misleading
effects. soodnan . (1979) refers to this ability as high operative
mobility. Some items are best solved by choosing a dense portion of the
pattern, and locating the figure that will serve as ground within it.
Other items are best solved by locating a relatively segregated figure and
using it to narrow down the search for a common intersection area. Since
the same cues which are facilitating on some items are misleading on
others, subjects who tend to take one particular approach (focussing on
size or density for example) on all items will often fail.
Goodman (1979) refers to a second operative mobility factor that improves
FIT performance: efficient perceptual-conceptual interplay. She outlines
two aspects of an item's selection.
1) The first aspect is the initial perceptual identification of the
relevant shapes, using a systematic procedure to identify each and
every figure ~ discovering what lines of the patterns go with which
figure and so on. The better the subject's ~ perceptual repertoire,
the more easily he/she will be able to follow a figure's lines and
segregate it from the others
2) Once a figure is identified, the subject must hold it in mind, "but
this holding must be conceptual, not perceptual, or else the figure
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will interfere with the perception of other figures, and may itself
be Ilost l as other aspe~ts of the intersecting pattern are explored. I1
(Goodman, 1979, p. 286). Furthermore, since the FIT is not a simple
perceptual task the subjects should be able to identify a speci f i c
triangle, for example, as ~ a n instance of a generic triangle, and
conduct the identification procedure on this basis.
This means that there must be a continual interplay between the
initial perceptual identification procedure, and the "conceptual
maintenance of the so segregated figure ". (Ibid, p. 286).
6.1.1.3 Executive strategies which reduce M-demand
The task analysis described above assumes that the subject uses the
strategy taught in the task instructions: to identify and simultaneously \
keep in mind all the relevant figures. Parkinson (1975) and Pascual-Leone (
and Burtis (1975) have suggested an alternative strategy that could reduce
~-demand and thus play a role in FIT performance. This strategy would
' begi n by finding the area of intersection of two shapes, and then finding
the intersection of this particular area with a third shape. By
progressing in ttlis way, at anyone step one would have to simultaneously
consider only the common area and the new shape to be intersected,
allowing higher class items to be solved as easily as lower class items.
Goodman (1979) notes that the discovery of such a strategy without
training has an M-demand of e + 5 and therefore should only be accessible
to the older sUbjects. It is unlikely that this strategy was used in the
present study. If it had been used it would have caused subjects to
perform beyond the level of k = 5 on the test - and this was not the case.
6.1.1.4 Implications of the influence of non-M factors on FIT performance
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~-stage effects were found on Trial 2, but not on the other trials. The
influence of non-M factors on FIT performance explains why ~-stage
effects were not found in these parts of the data.
11 To t he extent that strong non-M factors intervene in
a given task, the M-stage constraints may not appear
in performance ...- the non-M organismic factors act
as moderator variables and can be expected to mask, at
least in certain contexts, the overt manifestation of
the ~-stage effect. " (Goodman, 1979, p. 12).
In addition to noting the "masking" effects of f and l factors · on the
appearance of ~-stages, attention must be given to the developmental
course of the f and loperators. This does not coincide with the
developmental course of the ~ operator. This fact, together with the
composition of the sample will be used to explain the fact that with
repeated testing the 7 - 8's exceeded their theoretically predicted
performance level by such a wide margin, as opposed to the 11 - 12 1s who
did not exceed criterion.
The TCO posits that each ~-stage lasts for two years. Successive M-stages
develop maturationally, beginning on odd chronological years. Thus 7 -
81s will have an Mof e + 3, 9 - 10 ls of e + 4 and 11 - 12 1s of e + 5. A
"pure" ~-measure should yield constant performance on M-tasks throughout
each two-year stage.
However Mis the only metaconstruct that changes in power with age alone.
Learning is a continuous and cumulative process, and thus the
developmental course of learning-related operators such as !f and f (whose
developmental course follows the course of expansion of the LC repertoire
of schemes) exhibits within-stage changes. Both!f and f develop
gradually and co~tinually. and their developmental curve is linear to the
~ step-wise curve. Thus while children of even and odd ages have the same
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amount of ~-power, according to the TCO even-aged children are endowed
with increased l-power and f-power and will thus be expected to perform
better than their odd-aged stage-mates on tasks such as the FIT.
This even-aged advantage, as well as the importance of l, f and executive
factors, will be related to the particular composition of the present
research sample in the following section.
6.1.2 The Composition of the Research Sample
6.1.2.1 The children were drawn from the Dukemini Junior Primary School
which offers schooling from Grade 1 to Grade 4, the first four years of
schooling. The subject sample of children of ages 7 to 12 was drawn from
the second, third and fourth years of schooling.
The law specifies that children should start school at the age of 6 years.
Thus children who start school at the prescribed age and do not fail
should be 6/7 in Grade 1, 7/8 Grade 2, 8/9 in Grade 3 and 9/10 in Grade
4. This means that by 10 years of age they are already at, or about to go
to a senior primary school.
For this reason we can assume that children of 11 and 12 years of age who
are still in the second, third, and fourth year of school have either
failed one or more years of schooling or started school at an age of more
than 6 years of age for some reason (which is not uncommon). Children who
have failed at school are likely to have poor L, F and executive
~
operators, since these are linked to successful school achievement.
Children who for other reasons are in a school grade below their age
potential may have had an inadequate opportunity to develop age-
appropriat~ l, f and executive operators, due to inadequate exposure to
age-appropriate learning material.
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By the same token, children of 7 - 8 in this subject sample are likely to
have age-appropriate l, f and executive operators, and/or have had an
adequate opportunity to develop to their maximum cognitive potential.
Thus it may be argued that by virtue of the particular parameters of the
sample pool, the subject sample is composed of a group of above average 7
- 8 year aIds, average 9 - 10 year aIds and below average 11 - 12 year
aIds with regard to development of F, L and executive operators.
(A forthcoming research project will investigate the correlation of the
subjects' measured ~-power with their performance on a test of field
dependence/independence (associated with the f-operator) and a test for
L.)
On Trials 3 and 4 the 7 - 8's and 9 - 10's performed at above their
theoretical age-appropriate level not due to an ~-capacity exceeding the
theoretical prediction for their particular age group, but due to strong
L, F and executive factors. "The TeO suggests ... that non-M processes,
ego those related to land f, can lead to the same performance as a given
higher M-power level." (Goodman, 1979, p. 368).
6.1.2.2 A second feature of the composition of the sample may have
contributed to the extreme over-performance of the 7 - 8's as opposed to
that of the 11 - 12's. This is the fact that the 7 - 8 group consisted
predominantly (76%) of 8 year aIds, while the 11 - 12 group consisted
predominantly (70%) of 11 year olds. This means that the 7 - 8 group was
heavily weighted with older even-year subjects, while the 11 - 12 group
was heavily weighted with younger odd-age subjects. This is important in
the light of Goodman's (1979) evidence for the executive and figurative
superiority of the even-year subjects of each developmental stage. Such
subjects are usually more proficient for example at overcoming embedding
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contexts (ie overcoming If and I misleading effects), and more likely
to be guided by If and I facilitating effects. For this reason one would
expect the 7 - 8's to be far more likely to exceed their age criterion
than the 11 - 12 1s through the help of FIT-appropriate non-M factors.
Having suggested reasons for the deviation of the present FIT scores from
the TeQ's theoretical predictions, this discussion now turns to a more
detailed analysis of the process of change/development from Trials 1 to 4
in terms of the functional structure of the metasubject.
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6.2 Changing Metasubjective Processes from Trial 1 to Trial 4
In the light of the preceding section outlining the characteristics of the
FIT, and the Mand non-M resources available to the subject to suceed on
the FIT, it is now possible to discuss in detail the changing
metasubjective processes in operation from underperformance on Trial 1 to
criterion performance on Trial 2 and overperformance on Trials 3 and 4.
Investigation of such a process of confronting and mastering an unfamiliar
task is the central issue in the present research framework which sees
11 participants ' (in the world as) involved primarily through their
confrontation with contradictions; contradictions between the familiar and
the unfamiliar, or the old and the new, that highlights the issue of
change ll (Craig, 1985, p. 8). This section seeks to explicate this process
of confrontation in terms of the interaction between mind/development (the
context-free operators in cognition) and learning/culture (the context-
specific operators) as postulated by the TCO's model of the bilevel
organisation of metasubject.
This explication constitutes a rational reconstruction at the level of
intrinsic generative mechanisms of the II psychological machineryll
underlying the miniscule process of development provoked in the present
research. This is done in an attempt to explicate the "deep structures 11
responsible for change.
6.2.1 Trial 1 : Underperformance
The following factors are postulated for underperformance on Trial 1 :
1) The subjects have a relative lack of experience relevant to tasks of
this nature, as a result of growing up in a IInon-westernll culture
where· formal schooling is not predominant. This point is expanded in
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Section 6.3. Due to poor FIT-related learning opportunites, the
children have failed to develop the appropriate executives. Not
having the necessary executive plans at their disposal, they have
inadequate or inappropriate executive controls for the task - either
simply failing to mobilise their full !i-reserve, or else allocating
it to inappropriate schemes, thus serving to hinder rather than
facilitate success.
2) Due to the lack of appropriate executives to allocate the available
M-reserve on Trial 1, the metasubject may also be at the mercy of
misleading F, f and 1f structures which will activate inappropriate
schemes, causing them to become dominant, due to the executive
failure to boost more suitable schemes to "over-ride" the misleading
affect. Lack of experience also means that potentially facilitat ing
F, f and 1f factors are unlikely to be present.
3) Lack of experience of tasks of this nature would also be responsible
for poor operative mobility factors on Trial 1, particularly with
regard to efficient perceptual-conceptual interplay (section
6.1.1.2). It is postulated that on the first trial the children have
not yet fully comprehended that the t~st is not a simple perceptual
matching task, but involved matching shapes that often differ
markedly, in size and orientation. Thus for example it involves
identifying a token square as an instance of the type square, and
conducting the identification procedure on this basis. It appears
that by Trial 2 they have acqUired a greater facility with this
necessary perceptual-conceptual switch.
6.2.2 Trial 2 : Criterion Performance
Had the FIT only been administered once, it might have been concluded that
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the subjects lacked the ability to perform to criterion. However FIT
results on the succeeding trials support the hypothesis that the children
have the mental capacity, given the appropriate experience, to succeed. 0
By Trial 2, after one exposure to the task, and two exposures to detailed
task instructions, they perform to criterion. Thus by Trial 2 the
children have developed FIT-appropriate executives. It is important to
note that although the children are presented with the opportunities to
learn these executives in terms of exposure to the task, they actually
learn them by themseLves. That is the learning is i nt ra-psycho Logi caL in
the sense that the children are not trained in the use of specific
executives.
6.2.3 Trials 3 and 4 : Overperformance
On Trials 3 and 4, the dramatic overperformance of the} - 8 1s and 9 -
10 ls, as well as the overperformance of the 11 - 12 1s on Class 5 items
(their age-appropriate item class) is explained in terms of the
development with experience of the task, of FIT 'appropriate I and LC
facilitating structures and increased operative inability. In addition,
with more efficient allocation of ~ to activate the necessary schemes,
misleading f and If effects have less power. Furthermore, as has already
been mentioned (Section 6.1), with overlearning, the executive demand of a
task may decrease,leaving more ~ than would normally be available to a
child of a particular age group encountering new and varying tasks his/her
everyday life.
These I and LC effects as well as increased operative mobility factors are
all a function of learning/experience, and these are postulated to explain
how the subjects achieved higher FIT results that would have been the case
had the Frr been. a "pure 11 ~ test. However, it is important to note that
113
although these facilitating learned factors enabled the children to
overperform, there was a limit to their overperformance, reached on Trial
3. This means that there is a limit to the extent that L, LC and
operative mobility factors can improve FIT scores and/or that there is a
developmental ceiling on these facilitating factors. Goodman (1979)
points to the possibility of developmental ceilings on non-M operators
such as F and LC - an as yet unexplored issue.
In examining changes in the metasubject from Trial 1 to Trial 4, it -i s
possible to observe how the full extent of a child's context-free
cognitive potential lies dormant until he/she has sufficient experience
necessary for its efficient mobilisation. Thus actualisation of his/her
full ~-potential depends on the development of appropriate executives. In
turn the complexity of the executives that a child of a particular age can
develop is limited by his/her age-determined ~-power. Furthermore silent
operators such as f and If exist as propensities which every child is born
with. However in order that they develop, the child must have appropriate
experience. Thus although their origins are context-free, their
developmental course is context-specific.
r
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6.3 Mediated Learning Opportunites in Zulu-Speaking Society
In the previous section, the subjects initial underperformance on Trial 1
of the FIT was explained in terms of lack of FIT-appropriate executives.
This was attributed to lack of experience of tasks of this nature as the
result of growing up in a "non-western" culture where formal schooling was
not predominant. This section looks at reasons for the lack of these
executives on Trial 1.
It has already been mentioned that Zulu-speaking children have limited or
no access to toys such as puzzles , tinker toys, drawing books and so on
which are an integral part of the background of a child growing up in a
"western11 background. Even more important is that the fact that non- ~
western child-rearers may not always mediate between the developing child
and the external world in a way that is most appropriate for the
development of concepts suited to formal schooling.
The present research has focused on the intrinsic' generative mechanisms
involved in development. The studies of Craig (1985), Mindry (1984) and
Kok and Beinhart (1983) mentioned in this section work within Vygotsky's
(1978) framework, investigating cognitive development at the level of
extrinsic generative mechanisms. In other words they focus on the way in ~
\
which cultural "recipes for living" are transmitted to the child through
the mediation of adults.
Kok and Beinhart (1983) studied the way in which Zulu-speaking mothers
. instructed their pre-school children to solve puzzle tasks. They found
that the mothers' instructions were not consistent with the demands of
independent problem solving. Thus, for example, they tended to provide
non-generalisable instructions - instructions on where to place particular
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tasks of this kind, and with instruction of a formal nature. Mindry
(1984) looked at the teaching style of Zulu-speaking teachers, and found
that there was no significant difference in their teaching style to that v
of the mothers in Kok and Beinhart'sstudy. These studies suggest that
Zulu-speaking children are not exposed to "mediated learning" (Feuerstein
et aL, 1980) suitable for the development of the executives necessary for
success in formal schooling.
Craig (1985) suggests that Zulu-speaking child-rearers in rapid transition
between a "well-integratedand ordered traditional Zulu culture" . (p. 281)
and western social forms are faced with conflicting aims. They must
simultaneously rear their children to be competent members of their own
culture and competent members of western society to which they are
relative newcomers. These two cultural systems often have conflicting
social forms and goals. Thus, for example, she found that on the one hand
the mothers expressed the wish that their children should have as much
formal western schooling as possible. On the other hand, due to their own
lack of experience of this phenomenon they lacked the "tried and tested
recipes ll to suitably equip their children for it.
IIMothers, or any other caretaking figures, must
prepare children to participate as actors in a social
group whose roles and expectations they may not
themselves fully underst.and " (Miller, 1984, p. 22).
For this reason Zulu-speaking children come to school inadequately
equipped with executives whose existence would simply be taken for granted
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in schoolchildren in so-called western-industralised-urban-technological- ~
schooled society (Ibid, p. 21).
"They (the mothers) desire entry into, and successful
participation in this institution, yet have not
incorporated into their child-rearing. a concordant
support system in order to achieve this goal. For
example, preparing pre-school children for school by
teaching them s,chool-related tasks, or helping school-
children with homework, or encouraging verbal
interaction, do not emerge as powerful forces in
(their) indigenous theory of childhood. It seems that
in some cases the intruding culture, or the new social 1,
forms that confront people, provides actors with goaLs
but without the accompanying beliefs, desires, and
actions that would render acquisition of these goals
immediately accessible. Furthermore, judging from the
mothers I regulation of their children during the
problem solving situation, they seem to have goals
different from those required by the formal school
system .... " (Cra i g, 1985, pp. 277 - 278).
Thus Craig found, for example, that Zulu mothers stressed the importance
of passivity and obedience in the childrens ' behaviour: qualities which
may often be antagonistic to the requirements of formal schooling that
they become independent problem solvers. Their teaching styles did not
encourage an exploratory, questioning attitude to the tasks.
liThe indigenous theory of childhood reconstructed from
the mother's interviews emphasises the importance of
example and demonstration as teaching methods and
observation and imitation as primary modes of learning
required of children" (Craig and r~iller, 1984, p. 9).
The focus of these researchers on extrinsic generative mechanisms
complements the focus of the present research on intrinsic mechanisms.
Both these levels will have to be accommodated in any attempt to






In its focus on the intrinsic generative mechanisms at work in the
metasubject , the present research has demonstrated that in spite of
initial underperformance on the FIT, the subjects possessed the inherent
mental capacity to develop the necessary executives intra-psychologically \
(once provided with the necessary external mediation in the form of
repeated exposure to the task as well as detailed task instructions). In 8~J"
. «"Vv
so doing this research has supported Pascual-Leone1s contention that all ~{y ;
1'4.
~ d
r/ children have the same ,.!:!-power, and that performance ifferences among 0"
#~
various groups of children are the result of different learning
experiences. These result in different context-specific repertoires of
cognitive structures that equip children best for tasks rooted in their
particular cultural framework.
This conclusion has particular implications for South Africa, where
"divide and rule, the central tenet of apartheid, creates the situation
where racial differences are constantly emphasised at the cost of
universal human characteristics.
"Any indication of what appears to be differences may
provide justification for separation .... It has been
argued by its proponents that apartheid . should be
viewed as a reasonable system in which people with
different socio-historical traditions and context-
specific experiences are able to co-exist" (Craig and
Miller, 1984, pp. 1 - 2).
It is on the basis of such assumptions about the irreconcilable
differences between race groups that the white apartheid ideologists
justify their systematic discrimination against black South Africans in
such a way that they are able to entrench their dominant position on the
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economic, political and social fronts.
liThe structures of South Africa sustain a situation in
which it is whites (though not all whites) who are the
accumulators of capital, the wealthy, and the
powerful, while the majority of blacks (though not all
blacks) are the unemployed, the ultra-exploited, the
poor and the power-less" (Legassik, 1974, p. 30).
The present project has sought to undermine apartheid's insistence on the ~M
--....J
irreconcilability of racial differences in two important ways. First by
the support it provides for the notion of uni versal cogni ti ve capacit ies ,
Secondly by its focus on the generative mechanisms that produce change , -
or, in other words" enable the individual to overcome those particular
constraints of his/her social and historical conditions that may serve to
hinder particular changing goals in a rapidly changing society. Thus
there seems to belittle justification for this obsession wi th difference, .:.;
or for ' the implication that cultural differences cannot be transcended.
Furthermore, the present focus on change points to the possibility of
transfer of social forms and skills from African to western groups and
vice versa in such a way as to enrich and benefit both cultural groups.
On one level research of this nature serves to show up the spuriousness of
the apartheid ideologists'
,J \
assumption that racial differences are so ~ ~;-,
unbridgeable, and communication between black and white South Africans so
unlikely, that they should even live in different "national states". On
another level it makes a contribution to psychology in general in terms of
the light it throws on the way in which individual and social factors
interact in mental functioning in any society. This takes us back to
f~iller and Craig's (1984) point that we become so enmeshed in our own
particular frame of reference that we are unable to see how mind and
culture i~teract in every aspect of our experience. Thus we turn to other
('0/( i l'
~ J/ viii ;A ,{/( c i f.,' /'/ --h / '
. -. . /, '~~f"o/',y,. ,1
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cultures to gain the necessary perspective not to compare how people in
other cultures do "their tricks ", but to understand how we do "our
tricks". (p, 14).
6.4.2 Support for the notion of developmental stages
The present research has also made a case for Pascual-Leone's claim
that there is a developmental ceiling to performance for each age group
a limit beyond which performance cannot improve due to stage-related
limits in M-power.
This has particular implications for the cultural relativists' learning
account of development as the gradual accumulation of context-specific
experience. There is a popular and controversial trend in psychology in
general to assert that "... the concept of stage will not, in fact, figure
importantly in future scientific work on cognitive growth" (Flavell, 1977,
p. 249). Brainerd UJ78) has been a particularly influential exponent of
this position, holding that the notion of developmental stages is not q
empirically verifiable. The present results support the existence of age-
related stages. The evidence for developmental ceilings on performance is
incompatible with the learning account of development.
· 6.4.3 Heredity-Environment?: A Non-Issue
In conclusion it is suggested that the present evidence for the
importance of both mind and culture in cognitive development, and the
intricacy of their interaction, points to the folly of attempting to view
them as separable systems, or to isolate one of these phenomena as a
predominant factor in cognitive development.
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In the light of results of this nature. the age old heredity-environment
or mind-culture debate becomes a non-issue.
{iJ IJOn the one hand the present
research framework supplements approaches such as that of the LCHC and
Cole. It shows the limitations of their exclusive focus on context-
specific aspects of cognitive development at the expense of context-free
factors. thus precluding the explanation of how individuals and societies
change in response to changing social and historical circumstances.
It also points to misconceptions at the other end of the spectrum in the
work of researchers in the tradition of Jensen and Herrnstein who seek to
explain all performance differences on cognitive measures in terms of the
~'._,, _ . -. -_/
context-free aspects of cognition. They argue for qualitative genetic ~o
.c.>:
differences in the inteligence of various race groups (Jensen. 1969. 1972.
1977. 1981) or social classes (Herrnstetn, 1973. 1977) - inherent
differences in intellectual capacity.
This sort of work has been widely criticised. However while its
detractors insist that environmental/SES differences are crucial
determinants of performance. and allude to the existence of universal
human competencies. they provide no empirical demonstration of these
capacities. neither do they, suggest the processes according to which
context-specific and context-free aspects of cognition interact to produce
performance. Thus. for example. the work of Kamin (1977a. 1977b. 1981)
serves to show that Jensen has failed to prove a link between IQ and
heredity. through his critique of the major sources of evidence that have
been used to support Jensen1s claims that IQ is inheritable.
"Th~ data have repeatedly demonstrated profound
envIronmental effects on IQ scores in circumstances
where. the genes cannot be implicated. The apparent
genetIc effects. upon analysis. have invariably been
confounded with environmental factors that have been
slighted or ignored" (Kamin , 1977. p. 225).
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He ends his major book (1977) with Watson's famous dictum
"Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my
own specified world to bring them up in and I'll
guarantee to take anyone at random and train him to
become any type of specialist I might select - doctor,
lawyer, artist, merchant , chief and, yes even beggar-
man and t hief regardless of the race of his
ancestors" Ovatson, quoted in Kami n, 1977, p. 229).
However his work goes no further than asserting the strong possibility of
environmental influences on performance. Pascual-Leone's theory provides
a framework which f i l ls this gap, and offers the possibi lity of showing
exactly how the influences of learning/experience/environment may operate
in the process of development or change.
By showing that individuals are neither prisoners of static cultural
constraints nor victims of a variable genetic inheritance , Pascual-Leone [ / 1
provides "an explanation of how individuals do and are able to change
their being-in-the-world." In so doing his work becomes a foundation
stone for a "psychology 'of liberation". (Craig and 'Miller, 1984 , p. 2).
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6.5 Suggested Extensions of the Present Research
Two sorts of extensions will be suggested in this section. The first
relates to specific issues arising out of this study's particular testing
procedure, and the second relates to more general issues.
On the specific level, the present research project has taken the
FIT RAC 794, a test designed to be administered once, and applied it four
times. The result of this is that the possibility raised by Goodman
(1979) of non-M factors influencing FIT scores is greatly increased.
Th i s is due to the fact that repeated exposure to the test gives the
metasubject an increased opportunity to learn a variety of non-M
facilitating mechanisms, which serve to confound the FIT's efficacy as an
M-measure.
Thus, in order that the FIT be more successfully used in repeated testing
of this nature, several issues need to be explored.
The first issue which must be addressed is the relation of FIT scores to
F and L measures. An investigation of the relation between FIT scores
and measures of field dependence-independence (Witkin and Berry, 1975 ) is
already planned at Natal University, Durban. This measure is aligned to
Pascual-Leone's F factors (Globersen, 1985).
Another problem that was raised in applying the FIT several times was
that, in spite of the facilitating effects of learned £. and!:. effects, a
developmental "ceiling" was reached. This raises two possibilities that
should be investigated. The first possibility is that of developmental
restrictions on the F and L factors. The second possibility is that
there is a"limit. to the extent to which F and L factors can facilitate FIT
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performance, i rrespect ive of whether there is a deveIopmenta I restri et ion
on their acquisition.
Another interesting issue is the fact that the metasubjective task
analysis mentioned in the present research (section 6.3): is only one
possible account of the executive strategy used on the FIT. Goodman
(1979) has raised the issue of one alternative strategy available to older
subjects (section 6.1.1.3). It would be interesting to examine the
pos s ib i l i ty of other alternative strategies, including those available to
younger subjects.
Miller (pers. comm.) has suggested the possibility of an executive
strategy which may be successfully used for the lower item classes 3, 4
and 5, but which would cease to be effective on higher item classes as F
and Le misleading effects such as size and density factors intensified.
The existence of such a strategy would throw more I ight on the present
research's interesting finding that the 7-8's performance improved by two
k-units with repeated testing, while the 11-12's improvement was
relatively less spectacular. It would be informative in this regard
insofar as it implied that more accessible strategies were available for
the 7-8's to overperform than were available to the 11-12's (where the
same degree of over-performance would require success on the higher item
classes 6 and 7).
On a more general level the present research findings point towards an
investigation. into the precise nature of the executives required by formal
schooling, and into the development of specific techniques in which
teachers can be trained to better transmit problem-solving skills.
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However to attempt to apply remedial measures at the metasubjective level
alone may be likened to trying to lead a camel through the eye of a
needle. The cognitive development of black South African children takes
place within a complex of problematic social, pol itical and economic
levels, all of which must be addressed by the process of change.
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V-Scaling: Means and Standard Deviations for the Three Age Groups on Each
Trial for the Seven Item Classes (Means above, standard deviations below)
Item Class 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
A1 T1 4.507 3.343 2.537 2.746 1.299 0.642 0.373
0.959 1.023 1.599 1.531 1.155 0.865 0.373
A1 T2 4.761 3.582 3.657 3.567 2.164 1.358 0.463
0.605 0.924 1.399 1.743 1.286 1.083 0.682
A1 T3 4.925 3.761 4.209 4.522 2.955 1.761 1.045
0.317 0.653 1.081 1.375 1.618 0.986 1.107
A1 T4 4.970 3.851 4.119 4.164 2.493 1.582 0.612
0.602 0.399 1. 162 1·452 1.284 1.143 0.673
A2 T1 4.578 3.360 3. 114 3.132 1.570 0.982 0.325
1.136 1. 161 1.692 1.884 . 1.343 1.081 0.645
A2 T2 4.868 3.763 3.956 4.202 2.482 1.570 0.816
0.388 0.669 1.272 1.652 1.312 1.167 0.937
A2 T3 4.930 3.851 4.404 4.868 3.079 2.018 1. 123
0.289 0.484 0.900 1.266 1.421 1. 121 1. 114
A2 T4 4.982 3.930 4.368 4.904 2.974 1.833 0.982
0.132 0.370 0.962 1.439 1.333 1.004 0.922
A3 T1 4.789 3.761 3.479 3.831 1.944 1.042 0.563
0.411 : 0.620 1.491 1.586 1.351 0.992 0.937
A3 T2 4.944 3.775 4.310 4.817 2.746 1.704 0.901
0.232 0.513 1.141 1.291 1.528 1. 151 0.796
A3 T3 4.972 3.958 4.634 5.225 3.423 2.183 1.338
0.167 0.264 0.779 1.198 1.284 1.257 1.082
A3 T4 5.000 3.873 4.620 5.085 3. 141 2.014 1. 141
0.521 0.335 0.663 1.262 1.211 1.102 1. 138
A1: 7 - 8 years T1 : Trial 1
A2: 9 - 10 years T2 : Trial 2
A3 : 11 - 12 years 13: Tri aI 3
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